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How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis:
Options for Following Precedent
Nina Varsava*
When courts deliberate on the implications of a precedent case in the
adjudication of a new dispute, they generally frame the issue as if there
are three paths through-(1) follow the precedent, (2) overrule, or (3)
distinguish-without acknowledging that option number one contains its
own garden of forking paths. My chief aim in this paper is to delineate
and evaluate several options for following precedent. I show that we can
respect the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis without committing to
any one particular method. I argue further that we have good reason to
refrain from endorsing any single method for following precedent, and I
propose instead a variable approach--one that is sensitive to the
contextual factors that make one method preferable to another. My
analysis reveals the methodological challenges that courts must face if
they wish to make good on the promise of stare decisis when they go
about their business of following precedent. I conclude with the
suggestion that we should be open to considering a no stare decisis
regime; at least in some types of case, adherence to precedent comes with
considerable costs and only tenuous benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
The most salient judicial disagreements about precedent turn on the
question of whether or not to follow some past case.' Once the court has
decided to follow a precedent, the application of that precedent often
comes across as a formulaic (even if at times complex) operation. That
said, no single method of following precedent has been universally
adopted or endorsed by the judiciary, and courts in fact employ different
methods depending on the details of a given case and its relationship to
past cases.
As I will show, in the scholarly literature there is considerable
disagreement as to the optimal method for interpreting and following
precedent, and the possibilities that have been posed are unsatisfying.
Despite the theoretical disagreement, commentators seem to share the
assumption, which has gone largely unquestioned, that there is a single
correct way for courts to handle precedent. Accordingly, commentators
have generally neglected the possibility of multiple co-existing methods
or, put differently, a variable method.
When legal reasoners seek to determine the relevance of some past case
for the decision of a new one, they interpret the past case-mainly
through the judicial opinion of that past case. The interpreter looks for the
meaning of the precedent with respect to the present dispute. There are
many intelligible ways in which this interpretive activity could be
conducted: for example, the interpreter might look for a clear statement of
a low-level rule in the past case and then determine whether the present
dispute falls under the rule; alternatively, she might look for a higher-
order rationale behind the clearly-stated rule, and determine whether and
how that rationale applies to the present case.
If we wish to evaluate the relative merits of each interpretive method,
we need to know what would make an interpretation successful-we need
a meta-interpretive method. In Part I of this paper I propose such a
method. My meta-interpretive method is functionalist or instrumental: I
suggest that a method of precedential interpretation succeeds to the extent
that it serves the justifying principles or values underlying stare decisis
itself.
Although various models of precedential interpretation have been
proposed in the theoretical literature, no comprehensive scheme for
classifying these models has been developed. This is very different from
1. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (where the opinions issued illustrate the
judicial debate over whether Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) should be overruled, rather than
the alternative ways in which it might be followed); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
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the field of statutory interpretation, where camps have been labeled and
well defined, and key players identified according-Justices Scalia and
Gorsuch as textualists, for example. By model of precedential
interpretation (which I'll just call model of precedent) I mean a picture
(inevitably simplified) of how judges ought to follow-that is, interpret
and apply-precedent. In Part II, I provide a taxonomy of precedential
models, and I evaluate each according to my meta-interpretive criteria.
Drawing on my conclusions from Part II, in Part III I suggest that
settling on a method for precedential interpretation requires making trade-
offs among the values underlying stare decisis. The attempt to maximize
one value will often mean sacrificing a different one. And yet, it is the
totality of these values that both judges and scholars suppose that a
system of precedent supports. I suggest that it is difficult to justify any
unified or consistent approach to following precedent; no single method
does a good job at realizing the key values or goals underlying stare
decisis. Moreover, even if we focus on maximizing only one value, the
optimal method will depend on the type of case under consideration and
the relationship of the given case to previous ones, a point I illustrate
through a series of case studies. I suggest that we can best serve the values
underlying stare decisis by embracing a variable approach, albeit in a
systematic way.
Finally, I conclude Part III by questioning whether maintaining a
system of precedent is, on balance, desirable in all types of dispute. The
case for precedent is perhaps the least compelling in the context of
statutory interpretation, and yet courts purport to give special deference to
precedents interpreting statutes. I suggest that this practice comes at the
cost of democratic values, and does not deliver enough benefit to offset.
that cost.
Nevertheless, I assume that the doctrine of stare decisis is more or less a
fixture of the U.S. legal system and kindred systems. Moreover, I take the
key principles that have been invoked to justify stare decisis-including
predictability and equality-to be worthy values. Accordingly, I think we
would benefit from a better understanding of which methods for
following precedent do relatively better or worse to serve these values,
and under what conditions. My main purpose here is to make progress
toward that end.
I. APPRAISING COMMON LAW REASONING
A. A Meta-Interpretive Method
In this section, I set out a meta-interpretive method for precedential
interpretation. My meta-interpretive method takes as inputs first-order
[Vol. 30:266
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methods of precedential interpretation-that is, methods of interpreting
precedent itself-and both interprets and evaluates those first-order
methods. The point of the meta-interpretive step is to provide a means by
which we can determine whether, and why, one interpretive method at the
first order is better than another. In Legality, Scott Shapiro distinguishes
between interpretive and meta-interpretive methodologies of legal texts in
general. 2 My argument here draws on his analysis of these categories. An
interpretive methodology is a "method for reading legal texts." 3 Examples
of interpretive methodologies are textualism, purposivism, and
originalism. These methods, however, do not themselves tell us how to
resolve interpretive disputes. For that we need a meta-interpretive
method: a tool "for determining which specific methodology [at the first
order] is proper." 4
It is under stare decisis, or the doctrine of precedent, that legal cases
make law. Pursuant to stare decisis, judicial decisions constitute legal
norms that people are bound to follow and that courts are bound to
interpret and enforce. I wish to keep the justificatory question separate
from the explanatory one. The existence of the doctrine of precedent
might be explained by historical and social facts; we might have the
doctrine just because a convention happened to develop where courts
follow one another's decisions. But that explanation would not justify the
practice. To justify the practice we need to show that it has some value.
Why have case law? The rationales-which include protecting reliance
or expectation interests and ensuring fair or equal treatment-are
relatively clear and settled. They are widely cited in both judicial opinions
and legal scholarship. These rationales, each of which refers to a basic
and intuitive value, reveal the point of treating similar cases the same-or
in other words what the legal system purports to accomplish with the
doctrine of precedent. If the stated values behind precedent are to justify
the doctrine, then the practice of following precedent had better in fact
align with them. Accordingly, I propose that a particular interpretive
method for case law is a good one if, and to the extent that, interpreting
case law according to that method serves the values that stare decisis is
supposed to serve. If we wish to assess interpretive methodologies, then,
we need to be clear on the values that it is the purpose of stare decisis to
serve, as well as the relative importance of these values. In the next
section, I delineate the stare decisis values, and in addition, discuss their
acceptance and endorsement among courts, lawyers, and legal scholars
alike.
2. SCOTT. J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, 248 (2013).
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Moreover, for a model of following precedent to be successful, it must
be (to some extent) realistic, in that the method the model describes must
be feasible for courts to apply. I call this the reality constraint on
interpretive models. The idea behind this constraint is that attempts to
articulate interpretive methods should be practical, meaning that they
should give guidance that courts could actually implement.
On my view, a proper comparative evaluation among interpretive
methodologies involves evaluating the extent to which the different
methods would further the values of stare decisis in total. However, some
of these values are more important than others. Moreover, some of the
values that have been cited as distinct seem in fact to be derivative of
others. Accordingly, when I evaluate models of precedent according to
how well they serve stare decisis values, I weight the values differentially,
according to their importance relative to one another.
My approach to selecting, ranking, and weighing the stare decisis
values is largely deferential to other sources. Although I believe that these
values are real, that they are important, and that a legal system should
promote them, I do not advance independent arguments for any of these
claims. My aim, rather, is to demonstrate that actors operating within our
legal system, and commentators writing about it, seem to think that the
doctrine of precedent does in fact serve the values I elaborate and that it
should serve these values.
B. Values or Goals of Precedent
The most prominent rationales for stare decisis are predictability and
equality, followed by judicial restraint or appropriate distribution of
power, credibility, and judicial efficiency. These are the five justifications
I have found to be most widely and confidently endorsed by theorists,
lawyers, and courts alike.' Moreover, commentators generally suppose
that stare decisis serves all or many of these goals.6 For example, Steven
Burton lists equal treatment, predictability, judicial efficiency, judicial
5. For a similar, but not coextensive list ofjustifications for stare decisis, see Earl M. Maltz, The
Nature of Precedent, N.C. L. REV. 367, 368-72 (1988). For a longer, but undeveloped, catalogue of
possible justifications for stare decisis, see Jeremy Waldron, Stare decisis and the Rule ofLaw: A
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (listing the following as considerations to justify
stare decisis: "importance of stability, respect for established expectations, decisional efficiency, the
orderly development of the law, Burkean deference to ancestral wisdom, formal or comparative
justice, fairness, community, integrity, the moral importance of treating like cases alike, and the
political desirability of disciplining our judges and reducing any opportunity for judicial activism.").
6. Unsurprisingly, some economists focus on the reliance or predictability justification
exclusively, which makes sense given that the protection of reliance interests is widely thought to
promote efficiency in transactions. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare
Decisis, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989). Randy Kozell has developed a theory of constitutional stare
decisis meant to promote stability and impersonality in particular. RANDY KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS
RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT, 6 (2017).
[Vol. 30:268
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restraint, and credibility as mutual justifications (among others) for stare
decisi s.7
The rationales I focus on here could be described differently8 and
further rationales could be added to the list. 9 For example, some people
have suggested that stare decisis serves a teaching or educational function,
where courts learn from one another how to adjudicate better; others have
suggested similarly that the doctrine promotes dialogue among courts.10 I
leave these and other potential justifications aside here, for the sake of
expediency, but also because I think that including additional possible
justifications would not significantly affect my main conclusions. I intend
to show that it is very difficult to justify any particular method of stare
decisis based on the values I identify. That task is likely to be even more
difficult if the doctrine is meant to serve further values still. Moreover, the
possible justifications that I set aside seem to overlap to a large extent
with the justifications that I include, so that discussing the former
specifically would be somewhat redundant even if more comprehensive.
For example, the teaching idea, as I understand it, is captured at least in
part by the appropriate distribution of power justification: precedent
enables some courts (higher and past courts) to exercise power or control
over others (lower and present courts) by showing them-or educating
them on-how to decide new cases.
7. Steven Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in Constitutional
Adjudication 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1696-97. See also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio
St. 3d 216, 236 (2003) (Sweeney, J., dissenting) ("[a]dherence to precedent has several laudatory
goals, including certainty, equality, efficiency, and the appearance ofjustice"); STEVEN BURTON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW ND LEGAL REASONING 17, 26 (2007) (justifying stare decisis with reference
to predictability or reliance and also equality or fairness); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977) at 37 (referring to the doctrine of precedent as a "set of principles reflecting the
equities and efficiencies of consistency); Karl Llewellyn, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 449 (1931) (listing together several justifications for stare decisis, including "time and
energy saved", "predictability", and equality); Stephen R. Perry, Two Models of Legal Principles, 82
IOWA L. REV. 787, 793 (1997) (listing "consistency and predictability" as among "the values
underlying a doctrine of following precedent"); Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial
Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1008 (1976-1977) (suggesting that stare decisis supports reliance,
fairness, and convenience mutually); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2, n.11 (1983) (offering the judicial efficiency justification as well as impartiality and
perceived impartiality).
8. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in A Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (dividing arguments for stare decisis
into the categories of "instrumental" and "intrinsic").
9. Stare decisis also seems to serve rhetorical functions in judicial opinions. For example, judges
might appeal to stare decisis to reinforce the authority of a decision or to give the impression of
neutrality, or they might invoke precedent in an effort to buck responsibility for a decision (Don't
blame us-we're just following precedent). These are functions of a different type from those I
discuss here, and I set them aside for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, as far as I am aware, they
have not been explored in any detail in the literature, and unlike the other, more conventional and
uncontroversial functions that I discuss here; there is reason to question whether stare decisis or the
notion of stare decisis should be used for these rhetorical purposes. I intend to examine them
independently in future work.
10. Thanks to Ying Hu for bringing the point to my attention.
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(1) Predictability or Reliance
Predictability and equality receive the most attention in the literature
discussing justifications for stare decisis; commentators widely agree on
the importance of these values. For example, Arthur Goodhart wrote that
"the most important reason for following precedent is that it gives us
certainty in the law."" When the law is predictable, people can rely on it;
this means that an individual can organize her affairs under more or less
correct assumptions about how courts would treat her should she be
involved in a legal dispute. A system of precedent allows people to rely
on past judicial decisions, and thus protects reliance interests.1 2 Stare
decisis is valuable, then, insofar as it both creates expectations concerning
legal outcomes and fulfills these expectations.
Courts also often cite predictability, certainty, or reliance as one of the
more important justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis. For
example, the Federal Circuit has declared that, "[t]he doctrine of stare
decisis enhances predictability and efficiency in dispute resolution and
legal proceedings, by enabling and fostering reliance on prior rulings....
By providing stability of law that has been decided, stare decisis is the
foundation of a nation governed by law."l3 Moreover, many courts have
maintained that stare decisis is particularly important in contract and
property cases, the assumption being that litigants in these types of case
are more likely to have relied on past rulings in making the decisions that
led to the disputes than are litigants in other sorts of cases-those
involving tort, criminal, and constitutional issues, for example.14
11. Arthur Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 40, 58 (1934). See
also David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) ("The
reason most often given for the practice of precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial
decisions."); Maltz, supra note 5, at 368 ("The most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of
stare decisis rests on the need for certainty in the law.").
12. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOZES OF LEGAL SCIENCES 29-30 (1930); NEIL
DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 118-19, 160-61 (2008); Max Radin, Case
Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning "Prdjudizienrecht inAmerika" COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1933).
13. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom; see also CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct.
2630, 2641 (2011); Thomas v. Wash Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (stating that stare
decisis "serves the broader societal interests in even handed, consistent, and predictable application of
legal rules"); George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 318 (1999) (explaining that, "[s]tare decisis is
justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, [among other reasons]");
Metro Renovation, Inc. v. State Dep't of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 345 (1996) ("Adherence to settled law
promotes stability and certainty.").
14. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381
(1977) ("Substantive rules governing the law of real property are peculiarly subject to the principle of
stare decisis."); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 622 (1965) (explaining that, certainty "is less
relevant in the law of unintentional torts, where conduct is not planned, then in the law of contracts or,
more particularly, in the law of real property," and implying that stare decisis is therefore less
important in tort cases); Conway v. Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 661 (1996) (arguing that reliance
is a weak justification for precedent in cases of tortious contact, since is unlikely that litigants based
their conduct on past judicial decisions). See also State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 523, 949 A.2d 1092
[Vol. 30:270
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The common view of reliance seems to be that the law should enable
and protect legal expectations; this is because decision making and
negotiations will be more efficient if people are able to form reliable
predictions about legal outcomes." Accordingly, we might see the
argument from reliance as a type of efficiency rationale. But, one might
hold, alternatively or in addition, that frustrating such expectations is
unfair, even aside from efficiency concerns. If I lead you to believe I am
going to do X, and my doing X might affect you, then, if I do not do X, I
do you an injustice-and this is regardless of whether any inefficiency is
implicated.
Some scholars have pointed out that the precedent system inevitably
fails to protect reliance interests, even if in theory it could. For example,
John Austin believed that "every system of judiciary law has all the evils
of a system which is really vague and inconsistent," it "is nearly unknown
to the bulk of the community, although they are bound to adjust their
conduct to the rules or principles of which it consists." 6 Austin's
complaint has some merit-the general public likely does not have
comprehensive knowledge of the precedential landscape; however, some
potential litigants (corporations for instance), and certainly their lawyers,
are aware of the key precedents that might affect them. Of course, the
extent to which people are able to rely on precedent will depend on the
method that judges use to interpret and apply case law. If the method is
obscure or complex-or if there is no settled method-it might be very
difficult or impossible for people to determine their rights under the
common law.
(2) Equality, Fairness, or Formal Justice
The equality justification for following precedent is widely cited both in
the scholarly literature and in case law, with many commentators
suggesting that equality is the most important principle underlying stare
decisis. 17 In The Nature of the Judicial Process Benjamin Cardozo
(2008); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 644-45 (1986).
15. Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 90, 91 (arguing that
"people rely on past decisions in the sense that they make decisions and commit resources based on
them").
16. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 652
(Robert Campbell, ed.,, Law Book Exchange, 5' ed., 2005) (1885).
17. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 24-25 ("Perhaps the most commonly cited reason [for
the authority of precedent] is that to accept precedents as authoritative is to facilitate consistency and
fairness in decision-making"); DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 116 (asserting that fairness or equality
"offers the only adequate account of the full practice of precedent."); Neil MacCormick, Why Cases
Have Rationales and What These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 155, 160 (Laurence Goldstein ed.,
1987) (asserting that, the requirement of following precedent "is a matter of formal justice"). For
criticisms of the equality justification, see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality,
Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L. J. 2031 (1996); David Lyons, Formal Justice,
2018] 71
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presented a vivid defense of the justification:
If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision. . . . If a case was decided against me yesterday
when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today
if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
material and moral, of my rights."8
The equality justification is often described in terms of comparative or
formal justice: regardless of whether people are otherwise treated badly
(substantively unjustly), if they are treated equally, then justice in the
formal sense is served.19 This type of equality is not just a legal principle,
of course, but a fundamental moral principle. 20 Many moral philosophers
have articulated and elaborated on the idea that likes should be treated
alike, perhaps most famously Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.21
William Frankena, in Ethics, puts it as follows:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two
similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is
- treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of
injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group;
and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some
relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned
and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged. 22
To motivate the formal justice argument, theorists often appeal to the
basic moral intuition that similarly situated people ought to be treated
similarly: "The proposition that 'likes should be treated alike' is said to be
a universal moral truth-a truth that can 'be intuitively known with
perfect clearness and certainty."' 23 Karl Lewellyn referred to "that
curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are
properly to be treated alike in like circumstances." 24 The principle of
Moral Commitment, and Judicial Precedent 81 J. PHIL. 580 (1984); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing that very idea of comparative justice is empty, because
circular); Benditt, supra note 15, at 90; but see Steven Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas: Logical
Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L. J. 1136 (1982) (both defending the equality
justification against some of these critics); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea ofEquality?, in FROM
THE BOTTOM UP: SELECTED ESSAYS 184 (2016).
18. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (2010), quoting W.G. MILLER,
THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE.
19. For a discussion of the equality justification, and a survey of theorists who have endorsed the
view, see Hathaway, supra note 8, at 153.
20. See Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REv. 297, 298 (1974) (stating that,
"many philosophers have even gone so far as to claim that all justice consists (essentially) in the
absence of arbitrary inequalities in the distribution of goods and evils").
21. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V.2. 1121a-1121b (349 BC).
22. WILLIAM FRANKENA, ETHICS 49 (2nd ed., 1973).
23. Westen, supra note 17, at 12 (quoting Chalm Perelman).
24. Llewellyn, Case Law, in ENCYLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 249 (1930); see also A.D.
[Vol. 30:272
11
Varsava: How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for following
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Varsava
equality is often invoked without further justification; it carries axiomatic
force. According to Joel Feinberg, "[t]he moral offensiveness of
discrimination is sui generis."25 Kent Greenawalt likewise asserts that,
"[t]he formal principle of equality is generally conceded to be self-evident
. . . ."26 The doctrine of precedent is taken to be the instantiation of this
moral principle in the law. 27
Courts in various jurisdictions and across levels of judicial hierarchy
often appeal to the equality or fairness argument for stare decisis. For
example, in James B. Beam Distilling v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held
that the point of precedent is to ensure equal treatment, and not merely or
fundamentally to protect reliance interests. Justice Souter, announcing the
judgment of the Court, insisted that the law must treat people equally
across time, even if reliance is not at issue: "[i]t is simply in the nature of
precedent, as a necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness
and equality, that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a
basis [i.e., on the basis of whether or not parties relied on a past case's
ruling]." 28 The Court of Appeals of Utah has described stare decisis as
"'crucial to . . . the fairness of adjudication."' 2 9 Justice Connolly of the
Supreme, Court of Nebraska has emphasized that, "[t]he fundamental
value of equal treatment, requiring that persons in like circumstances be
treated alike unless some relevant factor distinguishes their cases, is
central to traditional notions of Anglo-American justice." 30
- Conceptions ofEquality
We can achieve equality in some sense by treating alike all cases that
have some feature in common. However, justice does not care about just
any feature. If all litigants who were born on even days are given one type
of treatment, and all litigants born on odd days given a different type, then
individuals who are similarly situated in one intelligible sense would be
treated alike. But that like treatment would not be in the service of
comparative justice. Nevertheless, many cases are not so clear, and
reasonable people can disagree as to whether some instance of likeness
Woozley, Injustice, 7 AM. PHIL. QUART. 109, 115-16 (1973) 115-6, for a highly intuitionistic account
of formal justice.
25. Feinberg, supra note 20, at 319.
26. Greenawalt, supra note 17, at 185.
27. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 596 (1987); see also BURTON, supra
note 7, at 26; RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 107-8 (1961); DUXBURY, supra note 12,
at 60; DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 113; MacCormick, supra note 18 at 160..
28. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991).
29. State v. Legg, 2016 Utah. App. 168, 26, 380 P.3d 360, 369, cert. granted, 390 P.3d 719 (Utah
2017).
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between two cases matters for the sake of equality. I want to proceed as
much as possible in this article without committing myself to a
controversial conception of equality. Accordingly, I will sketch in broad
strokes what I see as the two most compelling conceptions in the context
of precedent-low-level and high-level equality. Ultimately, I think that
some combination of the two is most in keeping with commonly held
intuitions about equal treatment under the law.
Most simply put, under the low-level conception of equality, if a pair of
litigants across two cases engaged in similar conduct, then they should
receive the same legal outcome--even if the justification for the outcome
in the first case does not apply to the second case. The higher-level
conception of equality prioritizes consistency at the level of justification
or rationale. If the justification for the decision in the first case does not
support the same outcome in the second case, then equality does not
require deciding the second case the same as the first.
An example might help clarify the competing conceptions. Imagine a
dispute between a silence-lover and a noise-maker, neighbors. Suppose
that the noise-maker enjoys practicing with his band at all hours, which
causes great discomfort and distress to the silence-lover. The silence-lover
sues the noise-maker for damages or an injunction. Should the noise-
maker be required to satisfy the demands of the silence-lover? Let's say
the court says yes. Maybe this is based on the policy reason that allowing
noise-makers free reign would decrease social welfare. Now imagine that
a subsequent dispute arises between a similar noise-maker and silence-
lover. On the lower-level conception of equality, the case should come out
in favor of the silence-lover, just because the silence-lover won in the
previous case-regardless of the justification for the previous decision,
and regardless of whether it applies in the present case. On the high-level
conception however, equality demands that the second case come out the
same as the first only if that would serve the justification underlying the
past decision.
Both conceptions of equality seem to capture common-sense egalitarian
intuitions. If I were the silence-lover in a noise dispute, I would find it
unfair to lose the case if some past silence-lover who was subjected to
similar noise won her case. However, let's say that the past silence-lover
prevailed because in the circumstances of that case the noise-maker was
the least-cost avoider. If in the current case the silence-lover is the least-
cost avoider, but the court holds the noise-maker liable, then I think that
the noise-maker could reasonably complain about the result on grounds of
equality. Perhaps unequal treatment on the low-level is irrelevant as far as
justice is concerned. The silence-lover in the present case might appear to
be similarly situated to the past silence-lover; however, the appearance is
superficial. In a deeper sense, perhaps the sense that matters, the present
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silence-lover is similarly situated to the past noise-maker: they are both
least-cost avoiders.
* Ideally, the lower and higher-orders will be aligned: so that, for
example, if the least-cost avoider is the noise-maker in the first case, the
noise-maker in the second case will also be the least-cost avoider.
However, this kind of consistency is not guaranteed: background
conditions are subject to change. On my mixed conception of equality, it
is best to have equality at both levels, and it is better to have equality at
either level than no equality at all. I believe that equality at the higher
lever is more important than at the lower level, although it's beyond my
scope here to defend that claim in detail.
(3) Consistency
Some theorists have claimed that stare decisis promotes consistency, or
decision-making consistency in particular, and that consistency in itself is
valuable. According to John Coons, "the legal system represents the
central redoubt of normative consistency"-and moreover, "[r]ules of law
constitute an order generally thought to value consistency for its own
sake."31 Consistency itself is not as commonly cited in the case law as are
some of the other stare decisis justifications, but opinions do sometimes
mention it. For example, in Conway v. Town of Wilton, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut said that, stare decisis "'is the most important
application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture'
and it is an obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmaking
consistency itself has normative value."32
Theorists who take consistency to have independent value have not
provided a satisfactory account as to why we should, or sufficient
evidence that we do in fact, care about consistency in and of itself.
Frederick Schauer claims that, "[i]n countless instances, out of law as well
as in, the fact that something was done before provides, by itself, a reason
for doing it that way again;"33 elsewhere he notes that, "it is sometimes
desirable to recognize the values of settlement for settlement's sake or of
consistency for consistency's sake." 34 These claims beg for further
explication.
31. John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REv. 59, 73 (1987). See also Hathaway, supra note
8, at 152; Peters, supra note 177 (both discussing, although not endorsing, the idea that stare decisis
as a practice of consistency is good for its own sake).
32. Conway v. Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 680 (1996); see also State v. Peeler, 321 Conn.
375 (2016) (Robinson, J. concurring) (saying the same).
33. Schauer, supra note 27, at 572.
34. Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) about
Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Sci. 454 (2008). However, Schauer has also described consistency as
a means to achieving fairness: "We achieve fairness by decisionmaking rules designed to achieve
consistency across a range of decisions." Schauer, supra note 27, at 596.
2018] 75
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol30/iss2/1
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
We do not generally have reason to do something the same way we did
it before just because we did it that way before. If we treat people equally,
then we act consistently in some sense. But we can act consistently in
many senses without treating people equally. Without the equal treatment
part (and without other values that we might serve by acting consistently),
I see no reason to promote or celebrate consistency. If I have two equally
good routes that I can take to work, and yesterday I took route A, that fact
in itself gives me no reason to take route A today. In the context of the
common law, if p-ing is a particular way of dealing with a case-for
example, holding for defendant if the arguments for both sides are equally
compelling-then I do have reason to y in the future just because I p-ed
in the past. But that reason is provided by the equality principle (and
possibly other principles such as predictability).
The consistency justification for stare decisis is, I think, best understood
as an alternative way of characterizing other justifications: consistency is
good because it means that people are treated equally, or because it is
conducive to reliance, or because it lends an air of legitimacy to the law.3 5
Accordingly, I do not consider consistency as an independent value when,
in Part II, I evaluate possible models of precedent according to how well
they fit with the justifications for stare decisis. If one wishes to attach
independent value to consistency, the evaluation of these models would
have to be adjusted accordingly. However, if a method of precedent does
well with respect to other justifications, it is likely to do well also with
respect to consistency, and likewise if a method does poorly with respect
to other justifications, it will do poorly also with respect to consistency.
Consequently, taking consistency as a separate value is not likely to
substantially affect my results.
(4) Appropriate Distribution ofPower
Achieving an appropriate distribution of power is another frequently
cited goal behind stare decisis, although it is not generally given as much
weight as predictability or equality. If a court confronts a new case where
35. Peters, supra note 17717, at 2038, describes two conceptions of consistency in the context of
stare decisis: "consistency as integrity" and "consistency as equality" (on both conceptions,
consistency is a way of describing some other value). In his later work (e.g., DwORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, 184 (1986)), Ronald Dworkin puts the value of consistency in terms of integrity: judges are
under a duty to exercise integrity, which means deciding new cases in ways that are consistent in
terms of principle with their own past decisions, as well as the past decisions of other courts. I do not
have the space here to do justice to Dworkin's notion of integrity. On my view, however, both
integrity and consistency, in the context of the common law, are best seen as proxies for other values.
Sunstein says something similar to Dworkin, claiming that "[tihe supreme lawyerly virtue of integrity
is connected with achievement of principled consistency among cases." Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 784 (1993). If our system of precedent makes for
virtuous lawyers, that is a nice byproduct of precedent, but I do not think the benefit holds much
weight as ajusti1cation for precedent.
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relevant past cases exist, then stare decisis might determine the outcome
of the new case, thereby requiring the court to treat it the same as the past
case(s). Consequently, when precedents are available, the doctrine limits
judicial discretion and thereby "constrains the exercise of arbitrary
power." 36 As Justice Weaver of the Supreme Court of Michigan asserts,
"the consideration.of stare decisis . . . always includes service to the rule
of law through an application and exercise ofjudicial restraint . . . ."37
Stare decisis supports a particular distribution of power, where the past
has special force over the present, and higher courts have special force
over lower courts. Many legal experts commend this power distribution.
For example, Kenneth Abraham cites the circumscription of judicial
authority as a key function of stare decisis: "anchoring the justification for
... decisions in a past-in history and tradition-[it] circumscribes the
authority of its judges, who must make decisions in the present."38 Lewis
F. Powell (former Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) similarly argued
that an important aspect of the character of the Supreme Court's power is
the limitations that previous opinions impose on that power.39
Various plausible stories could help explain why we might want to
constrain judicial power through a doctrine of precedent. According to
Laurence Goldstein, if courts generally were entitled to disregard
precedent, "then inconsistencies, abuses and injustices-in short, chaos-
would indeed very likely ensue;" he concludes that the judicial right to
diverge from precedent should be "strictly limited." 40 Goldstein seems to
believe that the restraint imposed on courts by precedent is necessary to
preserve order in the legal system. Schauer says similarly that "some
types of decision-maker, when empowered to consider certain kinds of
facts, reasons, and arguments, [might] consider them unwisely and thus
produce mistaken decisions." 41 Precedent narrows the reasons available
for a decision-maker to consider.
Justice Frankfurter emphasized the ability of the precedent system to
unify a court over time; stare decisis, he claimed, is the doctrine "'by
whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court [the U.S.
Supreme Court] as an institution transcending the moment can alone be
36. Burton, supra note 7, at 1697; but see RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION
75-79 (1961) ("questioning degree to which [the goal ofJ restraining judges' discretion [is] served by
system of stare decisis" (cited in Peters, supra note 177, at 2113, n.275).
37. Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Titan Ins. Co., 487 Mich. 289, 314 (2010) (Weaver, J.,
concurring).
38. Kenneth S. Abraham, Three Fallacies of Interpretation: A Comment on Precedent and
Judicial Decision, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 772 (1981).
39. Lewis F. Powell, Stare decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286, 287
(1990).
40. Laurence Goldstein, Some Problems About Precedent, 43 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 88, 106 (1984).
41. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, 158 (1991).
2018] 77
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol30/iss2/1
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
brought to bear on the difficult problems that confront us."' 42 In other
words, stare decisis enables a court to transcend differences-both
synchronic and diachronic-among individual judges and to decide cases
as a single, unified institution. The doctrine might accomplish the same, at
least to some extent, over the judiciary as a whole.
(5) Credibility or Perceived Legitimacy
Credibility or perceived legitimacy, although less often and less
vigorously invoked than judicial restraint, is also widely cited both by
scholars and courts as a justification for stare decisis. The idea is that the
judiciary will appear consistent and stable, and will seem to be applying
law rather than making it up, if judges are bound by precedent. Burton,
for example, suggests that arguments based on precedent "tend, at the
least, to be . .. perceived [as legitimate]. Even when the Justices disagree,
the disagreement will be perceived to be one about the law when all of
them reason from the same starting points."43 Moreover, the appearance
of consistency and stability is thought to generate public trust. 44
Courts have similarly appealed to the credibility justification for stare
decisis. For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that,
"[s]tare decisis is justified . .. because [among other reasons] it promotes
the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging." 45 In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that, to
break with stare decisis and overrule Roe would lead to "the country's
loss of confidence in the Judiciary." 46
To the extent that the doctrine of precedent promotes public trust in and
respect for the judiciary and the law more broadly, the doctrine
concomitantly serves to enhance the institutional strength of the legal
42. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoted in
Powell, supra note 39, at 286).
43. Burton, supra note 7, at 1697; see also Stevens, supra note 7 at 2 (arguing that, "a rule that
orders judges to decide like cases in the same way increases the likelihood that judges . . . will be
perceived to be [administering justice impartially]"). For discussions of this view, see Schauer, supra
note 27, at 599-600 and Hathaway, supra note 8, at 152.
44. See, e.g., ARTHUR GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT,
75 (1971), cited by Stevens, supra note 7, at 2, n.11 ("[S]tare decisis foster[s] public confidence in the
judiciary and public acceptance of individual decisions by giving the appearance of impersonal,
consistent, and reasoned opinions."); Cardozo, quoted in Hathaway, supra note 8, at 152
("'[a]dherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith
in the even-handed administration ofjustice in the courts').
45. George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 318 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Westfield Ins. Co.
v. Galatis (Sweeney, J., dissenting), supra note 7 (listing "the appearance of justice" among the
"laudatory goals" of stare decisis); State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375, 446-47, 140 A.3d 811, 851 (2016)
(Zarella, J. dissenting) ("adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis creates the appearance, and at times
the reality, that this court is guided and constrained by the law-both written law, the constitution and
statutes, and decisional law, the rules set forth in the decisions of this court-and not the whim of its
individual members.").
46. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992).
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system.47 Tom Tyler and others have shown, with extensive empirical
support, that people's perceptions regarding the fairness of legal decision-
making procedures are strong predictors of their perceptions regarding the
legitimacy of the legal system: if people experience the system as fair,
they are likely to see it as legitimate also. 4 8 Moreover, when people
perceive the legal system as legitimate, they are more likely to obey legal
authorities. 49 Tyler found that when legal authorities violate people's
expectations regarding legal treatment, people perceive the legal system
to be less fair. 0 Several studies have also shown that people perceive the
legal system as fairer when people appear to be getting consistent
treatment under the law." To the extent that the doctrine of precedent
makes the law appear consistent, then, the doctrine likely makes the law
appear legitimate and in turn supports the effective exercise of legal
authority.
Even aside from the value of institutional strength or public obedience,
we might think that justice (where treating like. cases alike is a form of
justice) should be seen because it gives people the sense that they are, or
would be, treated fairly under the law, which is valuable in itself.
Moreover, the appearance of justice, created through judicial practices
that treat similarly situated parties the same, might be desirable because it
amounts to a public affirmation of equality, which has symbolic or
expressive value.52
(6) Judicial Efficiency
The judicial efficiency justification also receives significant attention,
although the consensus seems to be that it is less important than reliance,
equality, or judicial restraint. Many legal experts have noted that
47. See DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 95.
48. ToM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, 1990; Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Eugene
Griffin, Alternative Images of the Citizen: Implications for Public Policy, 41.9 AM. PSYCHOL., 970
(1986).
49. TYLER, id., at 58-61.
50. Id. at 97.
51. See, e.g., William R. Fry and Gerald S. Leventhal, Cross-Situational Procedural Preferences:
A Comparison ofAllocation Preferences and Equity Across Different Social Settings, ANN. MEETING
OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PSYCHOL. ASSOC. Washington, DC. (1979); Edith Barret-Howard and Tyler,
Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50.2 J,. OF PERS. AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 286
(1986) (finding that consistent treatment across people is more important than consistent treatment of
the same person across time); W. R. Fry and G. Cheney, Perceptions of Procedural Fairness as a
Function of Distributive Preferences, ANN. MEETING OF THE PSYCHOL. Assoc. Detroit (1981).
However, in his Chicago study (presented in TYLER, supra note 48), Tyler did not find strong
consistency effects on the perception of legitimacy. He notes that the finding is "puzzling," and offers
some possible explanations, including that participants in the study (unlike participants in other
studies that did find consistency effects) might not have had access to the information necessary to
compare their own treatment to that of others in similar situations. Id. at 153, 175.
52. See Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases be Treated Alike? 11 LEGAL THEORY 27, 31 (2005).
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following precedent saves valuable judicial resources, thereby improving
the efficiency of the judiciary. In reasoning from precedent, judges rely on
their own or other judges' past work rather than deciding new cases from
scratch.53 As Justice Stevens put it, the doctrine "provides special benefits
for judges. It obviously makes their work easier." 54 Justice Powell echoed
the thought, noting that the system of precedent "makes our [i.e., judges']
work easier." He explained that the majority of cases that reach the
Supreme Court are difficult: "Most involve hours of study and reflection .
... It cannot be suggested seriously that every case brought to the Court
should require reexamination on the merits of every relevant precedent." 5
In an economic analysis of stare decisis in the U.S. legal system, William
Landes and Richard Posner conceive of precedents as a "stock of legal
capital," which "generates a flow of legal services ... that may be defined
as bodies of information on the types of behavior that will be subject to
civil and criminal sanctions and the magnitude of these sanctions."5 6
The idea that following precedent saves on judicial resources also
appears throughout U.S. case law. For example, according to Justice
Sweeney of the Ohio Supreme Court, "[o]nce a previous court has
addressed difficult policy questions, subsequent courts need not expend
time and resources to readdress those issues, but can rely on the wisdom
of the previous court."57 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has
asserted that "[s]tare decisis is justified because [among other benefits] it
saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency . .. "8 However, the
extent to which the doctrine of precedent saves on resources will depend
on the interpretive method that judges employ in finding, interpreting, and
applying the relevant common law.
II. MODELS OF PRECEDENT
Through a survey of the literature on stare decisis, I have identified five
distinct theories or models of precedential interpretation: 59 (1) Realism,
53. See Schauer, supra note 27, at 599 (giving an account of this type of efficiency argument);
DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 93-94 (asserting that, "[a] strong prudential argument . . . is that
replicating an earlier decision on an issue rather than deciding the issue afresh is a good way of
conserving adjudicative resources"). See also CARDOZO, supra note 12, at 149.
54. Stevens, supra note 7, at 2.
55. Powell, supra note 39, at 286.
56. William Landes & Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
19 J. L. & EcoN. 249, 263 (1976). However, their analysis also highlights the extensive resources
expended in the creation of precedent: "time of judges, attorneys, law clerks, court clerks, jurors,
witnesses, and litigants, plus resources associated with the construction and maintenance of court
houses, plus other scarce resources." Id. at 264.
57. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis (Sweeney, J., dissenting), supra note 7, at 237.
58. George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 318 (1999); see also State v. Peeler, supra note 51.
59. A sixth type, the "result model" has been singled out by John Horty. John Horty, The Result
Model of Precedent, 10 LEGAL THEORY 19 (2004); see also John Horty, Rules and Reasons in the
[Vol. 30:280
19
Varsava: How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for following
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2018] Varsava 81
(2) direct-analogy, (3) balance-of-factors, (4) purposive or purpose-based,
and (5) rule-based. 60 While there are views that combine types or fall in
between types, the taxonomy I have settled on provides a general
classification scheme for existing theoretical approaches to precedential
reasoning. The categorization is meant to organize and clarify what is an
incredibly rich but also very messy theoretical landscape. It should help to
guide evaluations of the many views of precedent on offer, as well as
attempts to extend or unify some of these views.
Each of the theoretical approaches to precedent offers distinct insights
about precedential reasoning. However, these approaches have not
generally been developed in close conversation with the purposes of stare
decisis; nor have they been evaluated according to how effectively they
would serve those purposes. 61 In this Part I aim to both describe and
evaluate each model. I evaluate the models using the functionalist
approach that I set out in Part I. A model succeeds to the extent that the
practice it describes serves the justificatory principles of stare decisis:
predictability, equality, appropriate distribution of power, credibility, and
judicial efficiency. As I argued above, predictability and equality, as the
Theory ofPrecedent 17 LEGAL THEORY1, 2 (2011) ("According to this model, what matters about a
precedent case is not the rule it contains but first, the result of the case, and second, the strength of
that case for its result. Precedential constraint is then thought to be a simple matter of a fortiori
reasoning: a later court is constrained to follow the ruling of a precedent case when the facts
confronting the later court are at least as strong for the winning side of the precedent case as were the
facts of the precedent case itself.") I do not discuss this particular view, since I think it is very close to
the balance-of-factors view, and anyway best understood as some combination of a rule-based and
balance-of-factors model. Larry Alexander has elucidated three models of precedent: the natural
model, the rule model, and the result model. Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1989). Alexander suggests that these three models are "exhaustive of the possibilities." Id. at
5. As he shows, the natural model "is not really a model of precedential constraint at all." Id. On his
version of the rule model, the precedent-setting court must explicitly articulate the rule corresponding
to a case, and precedent-bound courts cannot distinguish a precedent from a given case if the rule
seems prima facie to apply. The version of the rule model that I offer, which I think is a more
plausible option, rejects both of these constraints. Alexander's "result" model resembles what I call a
purposive model, and his nomenclature seems inapposite to me.
60. My typology takes as a starting point George Lamond's identification of three different ways
to understand precedent: "(1) as laying down rules, (2) as the application of underlying principles, and
(3) as a decision on the balance of reasons." George Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal
Reasoning, in THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016). I revise Lamond's
second and third categories in my own characterization because it appears that what he means by
principles is basically purposes or higher-order reasons. I think it is confusing, then, to have a separate
category devoted to "balance of reasons" theories. What Lamond captures in the "balance of reasons"
category is a view that takes all relevant factors presented in the past case into consideration-where a
factor is relevant if it counts in favor or against the result of the case. In my own characterization I
call this the balance-of-factors view. Moreover, I include Realism and direct analogy as additional
categories, since each represents a distinct and influential way of conceiving precedent.
61. However, for an approach to constitutional stare decisis that is oriented around stability and
uniformity, see KOZEL, supra note 5. Kozel's approach is also notable for recognizing that at least
under some theories of constitutional interpretation, the ideal scope for courts to give to precedents
depends on the circumstances of adjudication. Id. at 87, 88. Nevertheless, Kozel still seems to assume
that ultimately it would be best if the Court adopted a single, non-variable approach to stare decisis.
Id. at 94, 145. See also Kozel, The Scope ofPrecedent, 113 MICH. L. REV., 179, 185, 226, 230 (2014).
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most important justifications for stare decisis, deserve the most weight in
evaluations; appropriate distribution of power comes next in importance,
followed by credibility and judicial efficiency, which I take to be of
roughly equal importance.
Theories of precedent generally aim both at descriptive truth-to
capture to some extent how courts actually handle precedent-and
normative truth-to articulate an ideal type, where it would be better if
this model were actualized rather than possible alternatives. While some
theories are more on the descriptive side and some more on the normative
side, my evaluations of them are mainly normative. I do impose a reality
constraint, which posits that a model should be rejected if it would be
infeasible to implement its method of interpretation in actuality. However,
aside from that constraint, I evaluate each model according to how well it
aligns with the values underlying stare decisis, rather than how well it
aligns with observed practice. I conclude this Part with a chart
summarizing my findings.
Since some of the proposals that I examine seem more concerned with
capturing how the doctrine in fact operates than how it ought to operate,
my analysis might seem at times to miss the point. To the extent that a
model is meant to be descriptive, I do not mean to criticize its proponents
for its normative deficiencies. However, given that my agenda here is
normative, the degree to which each method is capable of realizing value
is of primary concern for my purposes.
A. The Realist Model
(1) Definition and Examples
Legal Realists believe that judicial decisions are functions of the
propensities, preferences, and values of the judges who make them.
Accordingly, judgments of precedent are not determined by rules.62 Brian
Leiter suggests that all Legal Realists adopt "'the Core Claim' of Realism:
in deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of
the case, rather than to some legal rules and reasons." 63 Moreover, judges
are able to find rules in past cases to justify whatever conclusions they
prefer.64 Some Legal Realists believe that judicial decisions are products
of personal predilection only-this notion has been called the "hunch"
model.6s Others hold, similarly but less extremely, that judges rely more
62. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 65 (ed. M. P. Golding and W.A. Edmundson, 2005).
63. Id. at 52.
64. See Karl Llewellyn A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 444
(1930).
65. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Jerome Frank, Are Judges
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on intuition than legal rules to reach what they perceive to be just
decisions.66
For example, on the realist model, in the case of the silence-lover and
noise-maker6 7 , a judge might decide in favor of the silence-lover just
because she herself appreciates silence or has an intuition that silence-
lovers are more deserving of legal protection. For many Realists, the fact
that judicial opinions often depict "rules" is irrelevant: "judges' published
opinions at best hint at and at worst conceal the real nonlegal grounds for
decision." 68
A more sanguine branch of Realism maintains that judges tend to
decide cases according to what they believe wise policy requires, and that
judges are capable policymakers. Oliver Wendell Holmes endorsed this
view, which I will call policy-based Realism. 69 Holmes believed that a
judicial decision "can do no more than embody the preference of a given
body in a given time and place."70 Nevertheless, judges recognize that
they have a duty to "[weigh] considerations of social advantage" and
figure out which outcomes are most "expedient for the community"
affected; accordingly, judicial preferences tend to track good policy.71
For Holmes, precedential rules can be effective devices for
administering policy; accordingly, judicial opinions often do set out or
follow precedential rules. If judges make decisions that are optimal on
policy grounds, then in general, when facts repeat, a judge should follow
the outcome of an earlier case; that practice will generate the best results
in new cases. Moreover, for circumstances that often recur, having clear
common law rules enables people to adopt the necessary precautions to
limit their risk of legal liability. 72 However, judges do not apply rules
because they are bound to do so; rather, they apply rules in the event that
rules are in the service of the public good and for that reason. If some
Humans? Parts I& 2, 80 PENN. L. REV. 17 (1931) (both cited in Leiter, supra note 62).
66. See, e.g., Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 AM. BAR. Assoc. J. (1928); see
also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991).
67. See supra, Part I, Sec.B.2.
68. Leiter, supra note 62, at 60. See, e.g.,JULIuS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S
REASONING (1964) (arguing that the system of precedent offers a guise of logic under which judicial
creativity is concealed); Felix S. Cohen Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 824 (1934) (claiming that the very question, "'[w]hat is the holding or ratio
decidendi of a case?"' is "meaningless.). For a discussion of Stone's view, see MacCormick,
supra note 18.
69. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW (2013) (ebook). For example,
Holmes attests that, "[a] judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of
experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the community in ordinary instances
far better than an average jury." Id. at 124; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 466 (1897);
70. See Holmes, id., at 466.
71. Id. at 467. See also HOLMES, supra note 69, at 35-36.
72. See, e.g., id. at 112; Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596 (1898).
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common law rule fails on grounds of public policy, an able judge will
reject or revise the rule.7 3
(2) Evaluation of the Realist Model
My evaluation will focus on policy-based Realism, represented by
Holmes, since the more skeptical Realists believe that precedent has little
or no substantive role to play in judicial reasoning.
(a) Reliance
On Holmes's view, a line of precedent comes over time to stand for a
rule, which judges do and should follow when deciding new cases,
provided the rule continues to serve defensible policy objectives. In many
situations, then, people will be able to rely on common law rules and
organize their affairs accordingly. Even if they are not in a position to
discern the policy grounds for some rule or evaluate how well the rule
serves the collective good, they might still be able to make out what the
rule requires of them.
However, during periods of social and economic change, a rule that
served a particular policy goal previously might not continue to serve that
goal presently. According to Holmes, under these conditions a judge will
either apply a pre-existing rule but base it on a new rationale, or will
revise the rule itself.7 4 If judges were to revise rules as social conditions
change, ordinary citizens would likely have difficulty predicting judicial
outcomes. People would be unable to form appropriate expectations
unless they were especially talented and prescient in the realm of policy.
The protection of reliance interests would presumably be one piece of
input in a judge's policy-based decisions, given that those interests are a
component of the collective good; however, those interests could easily be
outweighed by other costs and benefits.
For example, consider again the stylized case of a silence-lover and a
noise-maker, neighbors. The noise-maker enjoys practicing with his band
at all hours, which causes great discomfort and distress to the silence-
lover. Assume that other such cases have arisen, and that courts have held
in favor of the silence-lover, declaring that the noise-maker must either
cease making noise or compensate the silence-lover, and thus establishing
a rule where noise-makers are to bear the costs in disputes involving noise
pollution. The underlying rationale for the rule-whether or not it is
apparent-might be that the noise-maker is the least-cost avoider.
But now consider the advent of a new technology: noise-cancelling
73. HOLMES, supra note 69, at 37.
74. Id. at 36-37.
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headphones. Arguably, the headphones enable silence-lovers to preserve
their silence despite the noise-making of their neighbors. That
preservation comes with some cost, but the cost might be less than the
cost that noise-makers incur when forced to give up noise-making. With
knowledge of this new technology, a court decides a new neighborly
dispute between a silence-lover and a noise-maker.in favor of the noise-
maker. Let's assume this is the first instance of a pro-noise-maker
outcome in this type of dispute. The change in background conditions
justifies, on policy grounds, an outcome that appears to depart from
previous decision. The collective good will be served best with a ruling in
favor of the noise-maker, at least until further technological innovation or
other social change dictates otherwise. However, the silence-lover had
relied on the established common law rule that favored her position;
suppose that she sued the noise-maker because she believed that she had a
legal right to her silence. The expectations of the parties were thwarted,
even if the outcome had a better cost-benefit profile than the conventional
outcome.
(b) Equality
The silence-lover in our contemporary noise dispute was treated
differently from previous silence-lovers. Other litigants were granted an
entitlement to silent air space in their own homes, whereas the present
litigant was denied that right. Moreover, she must bear the cost of buying,
wearing, and maintaining the headphones. Perhaps in its policy-based
reasoning, the court would factor in these equality concerns, and would
require the noise-maker to compensate the silence-lover for her
adjustment costs. However, I do not think that there is good reason to
believe that requiring the noise-maker to compensate the silence-lover
would be optimal on a public cost-benefit analysis. The calculations
themselves might be costly to perform, and allowing such compensation
might encourage excessive litigation. In general, rights trump cards have
no place in policy-based accounts of judicial reasoning. However,
sometimes it seems that the judiciary ought to protect rights, and in
particular the right to formal or comparative justice, even if doing so
would not produce the most public good."
(c) Appropriate Distribution ofPower
Holmes believed that judges have a duty to advance social interests and
that social interests are often advanced through the development of, and
75. See generally DwORKiN, supra note 7, for a vigorous defense of this position.
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adherence to, precedent.76 In this sense, then, precedent serves to
constrain judicial power in a desirable way. However, the constraint is a
loose one. On the policy-based view, judges should disregard or revise
common law principles and rules whenever they deem it socially
expedient to do so. Holmes had a great deal of faith in judicial capacities
and placed a lot of trust in the propriety of judicial motives;, in particular,
he believed that judges have the ability and tendency to make decisions in
the best interests of the public. On his model, precedent does not have
much of a role to play in limiting judicial discretion or allocating power
among courts.
(d) Credibility
To the extent that judges following a policy-based method of precedent
appear to be unbound by legal sources, the judiciary's credibility will
likely suffer. The primary role of the judiciary, as commonly understood,
is to apply and interpret law, rather than make it up. Some people see
policy-making as beyond the role or capabilities of the judiciary. Even if
we assume that the public would perceive judicial policymaking as
legitimate, judicial opinions often do not delineate clear and compelling
public policy arguments. Holmes acknowledged that judicial opinions
tend not to flesh out the policy grounds of their decisions: 77 "under our
practice and traditions," said Holmes, common law principles are "the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions,
but [are] none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last
analysis."78
Even if judicial preferences and intuitions ultimately track sound public
policy, then, that would not necessarily be apparent to the public, since
the policy grounds of decisions are not readily, if at all, publically
accessible. If case outcomes are sometimes inconsistent-in the sense that
even though facts between two cases seem similar, in one case the
plaintiff prevails and in the other the defendant prevails-the public might
perceive that inconsistency to be a result of the biases or whims of judges,
even if it is justified ultimately on grounds of public policy.
Finally, Holmes believed that judicial decisions follow the "inclinations
of the . . . community" and that experienced judges are adept at
"represent[ing] the common sense of the community in ordinary
76. See Holmes, supra note 69 at 467; HOLMES, supra note 69, at 36-37, 112-22.
77. Holmes did think, however, that judges should openly discuss policy considerations: "the
ease with which the law may be changed to meet the opinions and wishes of the public ... make[s] it
natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others should openly discuss the legislative principles
upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and should base their judgments upon broad
considerations of policy. . . ." HOLMES, supra note 69, at 78.
78. Id., at 35-36.
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instances."79 If judges aptly represent the values and interests of the public
broadly, their decisions might well be perceived as legitimate, because
they would appear to be right decisions all things considered. However,
most judges serve many and diverse communities, with differing and
conflicting values and interests. It is difficult to see how judicial decisions
could generate agreement among, or track the inclinations of, all
communities affected; consequently, the judiciary would have to rely on
grounds other than communal agreement for its credibility.
(e) Judicial Efficiency
On the assumption that judges are good policymakers, judges deciding
new cases can rely on past cases as exemplars of sound policy. Barring
changes in social conditions, judges would do well on policy grounds to
replicate past decisions, and would not need to perform the policy
analysis themselves, thereby conserving valuable resources. However, on
the policy-based view, judges are bound by precedent only to the extent
that following precedent will serve the public interest. Background
conditions change, in some domains frequently and drastically;
consequently, even if a past decision was in the public interest, repeating
that decision in the present might not be. Accordingly, judges bear the
cost of re-evaluating the policy-based merits of previous judicial holdings
in their determinations and applications of precedent.80
B. The Direct-Analogy Model
(1) Definition and Examples
Proponents of what I call the direct-analogy model of precedent
emphasize the role of direct comparisons or similarity judgments between
cases. Several theorists have suggested that precedential reasoning is
largely or wholly a matter of perceiving similarities between particulars
and treating cases the same based on those similarities. Just what makes a
similarity relevant, or sufficiently relevant, is a subjective matter-
basically, whether the similarities resonate with the observer as relevant
or persuasive. For example, let's suppose a precedent-setting court
decided a noise dispute between neighbors against the noise-maker. In the
precedent case, the noise-maker was part of a heavy-metal band that
practiced in the backyard, disrupting the peace of her neighbor. Suppose
that a new dispute arises where the implicated noise-maker keeps several
dogs in her backyard, and the neighbor complains about their barking. A
79. See Holmes, supra note 69, at 466.
80. See HOLMES, supra note 69, at 36-37.
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judge adjudicating the new case might perceive the facts as highly similar
to those of the past dispute and accordingly decide against the dog-owner,
without deciphering and applying any rule or principle.
Edward Levi advanced a direct-analogy view in Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, a classic text on reasoning in the common law. Although Levi
did believe in common law rules, he emphasized the importance of
similarity judgments in the process of determining and applying those
rules. For Levi, a concept is "given meaning by the examples to be
included under it." 81 "The scope of a rule," he wrote, "and therefore its
meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be considered
similar to those present when the rule was first announced." 82 For
example, when determining whether a defendant in a new case is liable
under a theory of negligence, we do not start by applying the rule of
negligence from the top down; instead, we look at past cases and ask
which of them seem most similar to the case under consideration: those
that held for the defendant, or those that held for the plaintiff.83
For Levi, "[t]he finding of similarity or difference [between cases] is
the key step in the legal process." 84 The direct-analogy view can be seen
as co-extensive with the I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach to decision
making, famously exemplified by Justice Stewart in his Jacobellis v. Ohio
concurrence (denying that a film in question was an instance of "hard-
core pornography").85 The idea is that we might not need, and that there
might not even exist, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
category inclusion; if we have examples of category members, we can use
our sense of similarity to determine whether or not some novel case
belongs to the category. Scott Brewer refers to proponents of the direct-
analogy account as "mystics," but nonetheless credits the view for
recognizing that "there is inevitably an uncodifiable imaginative moment"
in the process of precedential reasoning.86 The striking property of the
81. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTORDUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, 27 (1949).
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Justice Stewart expressed the point in the closing lines of his short concurrence: "I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"], and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that."
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring).
86. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 954 (1996). For further discussion of direct-
analogy accounts of legal reasoning, see Vincent Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial
Justication: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 82-84 (1985). For an elaborate
direct-analogy-type account, which employs Wittgenstein's family resemblance theory, see Roy
Stone, Ratiocination not Rationalization, 74 MIND 463, 481 (1965) (arguing that, "'legal decisions' . .
. 'consist of non-necessary truths which are obtained by reflection: reflection upon the likenesses and
dissimilarities of particular instances . . .").
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direct-analogy account is its embrace of perceptions of similarity as the
primary input of precedential reasoning.
(2) Evaluation of the Direct-Analogy Model
(a) Reliance
Some commentators take for granted that precedential reasoning
involves perceiving and judging similarities between fact situations, and
conclude that reliance on precedent cannot be reduced to "reliance on
substantive normative rules."87 The "condition creating the presumption"
of precedential constraint is similarity itself, and similarity is not a logical
relationship but rather a perception based in part on cultural and
subcultural factors.88 If we think that the general public is attuned to
judicial decisions and will perceive the same similarities and differences
among cases as courts do, then a direct-analogy approach to precedent
would seem conducive to the protection of reliance interests. I am not sure
that we should expect the public to share a similarity sense with the
judiciary, given that the judiciary is highly non-representative of the
general population; but we might more reasonably expect lawyers to be
attuned to judicial sensibilities.
(b) Equality
The equality principle presents serious difficulties for the direct-
analogy account. Why do similarity judgments as such matter? Doesn't
the kind of similarity matter? After all, according to the equality or
fairness principle, people ought to be treated similarly if they are similarly
situated in justice-relevant ways, not just if they appear somehow to be
similar.89 Tall people with blond hair are similar to one another, but that
provides no reason for them to receive the same outcomes in court.
Vincent Wellman criticizes Levi and others for failing "to provide useful
criteria by which we might evaluate judicial argumentation and assess ...
analogies." 90 "What makes one similarity relevant, but another not?" asks
87. Schauer, supra note 27, at 587.
88. Id. at 587, 588.
89. Michael Moore criticizes rule-based theories along the same lines, for leaving values out of
the picture (see this Part, infra, Sec. D.1.).
90. Wellman, supra note 86, at 82. Several commentators have noted the absence of a similarity
metric as a problem for the doctrine of precedent in general. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 248
("The obvious deficiency of the method of precedent is that, while the exemplar is identified, the
relevant standard of similarity is not."); DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 143 ("The notion of treating like
cases alike is . . . incomplete or empty until supplemented by criteria of likeness or difference.");
Wellman, supra note 86, at 99 ("The issue for a theory of judicial justification is what warrants one
analogy over the host of other comparisons which could have been drawn.").
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Wellman. 91 Every judgment of similarity or dissimilarity between cases
inevitably picks out certain similarities or differences and not others.
Missing from the direct-analogy model is an account of why and to what
extent we should care about some commonalities and differences but not
others. Theorists have not shown how the direct-analogy account of
precedent-as grounded in direct similarity judgments between cases-
would promote the kind of equal treatment that matters for justice. We
perceive all kinds of similarities that have no relevance for justice, and we
might well miss similarities and differences that matter.
(c) Appropriate Distribution of Power, Credibility, and Judicial
Efficiency
On the direct-analogy view, judges are highly constrained by legal
sources (in the form of precedents), even though that constraint is a
function of perceived similarities across cases rather than the extraction
and application of rules or principles. However, it is unclear why
similarity perceptions themselves provide an appropriate constraint. On
the one hand, if commentators who claim that. judges' similarity
judgments reflect those of the community are correct,92 then the public
might perceive the constraint that the direct-analogy model imposes as
legitimate, since in that event the judiciary would reflect the community's
views. However, on the other hand, ifjudges' similarity judgments are the
same as the community's, that should give us cause for concern, since
judges should presumably be better than ordinary citizens at recognizing
relevant similarities and differences-for example, we might reasonably
expect judges to be less susceptible to experiencing some likeness as
significant when it is in fact irrelevant from the perspective of justice.
According to Sunstein, an advantage of the direct-analogy approach is
that people more readily agree at the level of particulars than at the level
of rationales, principles, or theories. 93 Although limited empirical support
has been presented for that claim, the idea that agreement is easier to
achieve in the judgment of particular facts than higher-level legal
constructs is intuitively plausible. For example, we might agree that the
facts of Case A are very similar to those of Case B and that, since we are
required to treat like cases alike, we should treat B the same as A. This
agreement does not depend upon any further agreement as to what rule
91. Wellman, supra note 86, at 45, 82, 84.
92. For example, Levi supposed that judicial judgments of similarity reflect the views of society
or the community broadly. Supra, LEvI note 81 at 104.
93. Sunstein, supra note 35. The same claim has been made in field of practical ethics: in the
context of moral decision making, people are more likely to agree on the concrete decision about a
case than on a higher-order theory that would justify the decision. See, e.g., ALBERT R. JONSON &
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1990).
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Case A should be taken to represent, or what rationale or theory justifies
its outcome. Furthermore, if the prescriptions of precedent are conducive
to agreement, then a system of precedent might help to conserve judicial
resources in courts with multiple judges, since judges would not expend
much time or labor arguing opposing views.
C The Balance-of-Factors Model
(1) Definition and Examples
On the balance-of-factors view, precedents represent a set of facts and
rationales that, taken together, weigh in favor of a particular outcome.
What matters is not some rule that a past opinion sets out, but rather all
the reasons that the case contains both for and against the outcome
reached. 94 Although the balance-of-factors view is similar to the rule-
based view I discuss below, George Lamond suggests that the former is
superior because it better represents legal practice. 95 According to
Lamond, cases do not typically specify legal rules. Moreover, even when
a judicial opinion explicitly announces that some rule is being applied to
the facts, the opinion might include reasons that are extraneous to the rule
but that still seem to play a role in the decision.
Another alleged appeal of the balance-of-factors model is that it can
readily accommodate the practice of distinguishing. 96 According to this
model, a judge deciding a new case is bound to follow a particular past
case only if there are no differences between the cases that would justify a
different result. Two cases, then, can be very similar, with the new case
even falling under the rule enunciated in the past case, but if some fact
present in the new case was not present in the past case, that difference
might permit or require the judge in the new case to reach a different
conclusion-that is, if the additional fact pushes the balance of factors to
favor the other side. To return to the example of the heavy-metal musician
and her silence-loving neighbor, imagine that a precedent-setting court
decided against the noise-maker. Now suppose a new case arises with
facts that largely overlap with those of the previous case; under the rule
articulated by the previous court, the new case should come out against
the noise-maker. However, in the present case, unlike the previous one,
the disputants have been neighbors for over twenty years and the musician
has been practicing at home with his band for the whole period. The court
reasons, perhaps on an adverse-possession analogy, that this fact tips the
balance in favor of the noise-maker, even though the court in the past case
94. Horty, Rules and Reasons in the Theory ofPrecedent, supra note 59.
95. Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2005).
96. See Lamond, supra note 70.
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articulated no such exception to the pro-silence rule.
(2) Evaluation of the Balance-of-Factors Model
(a) Reliance
The balance-of-factors approach seems to put unreasonable demands on
people who wish to form legal predictions with confidence. To rely on
precedents, an individual would need to consider all the factors that count
as reasons both in favor and against the decisions in those precedents. The
error rate would likely be high and the space for reasonable disagreement
large. For similar reasons, the balance-of-factors approach would not do
much for judicial efficiency, since any element of a past case might affect
whether that case controls a subsequent dispute; even if the rule
articulated in the past case does not apply to a given case, the cases might
contain enough factors in common for the past case to control the present
one.
(b) Equality
If we expect that judges would consider the recurrence or non-
recurrence of past case factors in a given case as reasons to treat people
similarly, or differently, if and only if (and to the extent that) those factors
matter for justice, then a balance-of-factors method of precedent would
presumably work well to realize equality. Such an expectation would
place a lot of trust in judges and would make them responsible for
extensive moral reasoning. It is conceivable that this method is
appropriate to higher court judges (in the context of horizontal stare
decisis) but not lower court judges (in the context of vertical stare
decisis), since our system places greater trust in courts at the top of the
judicial hierarchy.
(c) Appropriate Distribution of Power, Credibility, Judicial Efficiency
The model does not exclude much material from the practice of
precedent; consequently, we might think that under such a system judicial
discretion would not be sufficiently limited. For example, judges might
more readily find a legal justification for whatever outcome they prefer if
they are permitted to construe any factors present in a past case and any
present in the given case as relevant to the decision of whether to follow
the precedent.
Without empirical investigation into the matter, it is difficult to say
whether the public would perceive a judiciary that practiced a balance-of-
factors method to be legitimate. However, if I am right to think that
people would have trouble predicting legal outcomes under such a system,
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then the system would likely lack credibility, since the application of
precedent would appear arbitrary and inconsistent. I suspect that the
credibility of the common law depends on at least the appearance of a
somewhat formulaic or rules-based system. To the extent that the practice
of precedent seems to deny the existence or importance of rules,
credibility suffers.
Finally, for reasons already discussed, the balance-of-factors model
makes out precedential reasoning as an incredibly resource-intensive
endeavor. In deciding a new case, judges would take into account all
factors that were present in plausible precedent cases, determine the
weight of each factor for or against the outcomes of the cases, and
compare the results to the present facts. While theoretically reasonable,
the method might be impracticable.
D. The Purposive Model
(1) Definition and Examples
On the purposive approach to stare decisis, the purposes, rationales, or
justifications underlying past judicial decisions, or then stare decisis itself,
play a definitive role in precedential reasoning. Where the rationales
behind a decision are policy-based, the purposive model overlaps with
policy-based Realism. The purpose behind a decision is distinct from a
concrete or low-level rule that might be derived from a decision in the
sense that the purpose is what justifies the rule. For example, a judicial
opinion might state its holding or rule as follows: "In the event that a
resident disturbs the peace by creating unusual levels of noise, the
resident must either cease or compensate his neighbors for the
disturbance." The purpose behind the rule might be to promote
community welfare. A judge who takes a purposive approach to precedent
would decide against the noise-maker in a subsequent case if she
determines that doing so would promote community welfare, regardless
of whether or not the noise-maker prevailed in precedent case.
Burton argues that, while precedents stand for rules, those rules are to
be derived, and interpreted, in light of the purposes that justify legal
decisions.97 Judges depend on the justifications behind rules when making
determinations as to what rule some case stands for, and also whether a
particular rule covers a new case. As an example, Burton asks us to
consider a rule such as the following: a valid will must be witnessed and
signed by two people.98 He asks what we should make of a case where the
97. See BURTON, supra note 7; Burton, supra note 17, at 1144.
98. Burton, id. at 1148.
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will in question was signed by three people. Given the purpose of the
rule-where the purpose is typically although not necessarily derived
from the reasoning presented in past judicial opinions-the will in our
novel case should be considered valid. After all, the point of the witness
rule is "to assure due deliberation and the exercise of free will by the
testator, and three is better than two for that purpose." 99 On Burton's
view, the purposes that justify a rule instruct legal reasoners as to its
proper application.
One might think that if we want the practice of precedent to serve the
purposes of stare decisis optimally, then courts should just apply those
purposes directly. A handful of theorists, including Michael Moore,
Dworkin, and Stephen Perry, have embraced some version of this view.
Moore rejects the common conception of precedential reasoning as an
interpretive or hermeneutic enterprise, arguing that this conception is
inevitably insensitive to the values behind stare decisis, in particular the
principle of equality.100 He argues that judges have a duty to consider the
principle of equality directly (along with the other key principles that
justify stare decisis) whenever they decide a common law case.
The ideal judge does not try to figure out and apply the rules that
previous courts followed or laid out, nor the purposes for these rules, but
rather seeks to identify the fairest outcome in the present case, given the
outcomes that other litigants have received. "Real equality," says Moore,
is given only when morally relevant likenesses and dissimilarities
are used as the benchmark for like treatment. What the precedent
court stated to be its holding, its material facts, or its reasons,
cannot be allowed to fix a case's holding without offending one of
the main ideals that gives precedent its point, namely, equality. 01
Moore believes that the conventional, interpretive conception of
precedent supports an "overly formalistic idea of equality," where cases
similar in arbitrary ways are to be treated the same just because of those
arbitrary similarities. 10 2 The proper work of judges is not to interpret and
apply rules or even principles that were applied in past cases, but rather to
determine the morally optimal outcome in the present case, according to
the values of stare decisis itself.
99. Id.
100. Michael S. Moore, Precedent ahd Non-Hermeneutic Legal Reasoning, PRECEDENT IN
LAW 183, 185-6 (1987).




Varsava: How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for following
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Varsava
(2) Evaluation of the Purposive Model
(a) Reliance
Purposive methods of interpreting precedent present predictability
problems. First of all, the higher-order purposes used to justify decisions
typically leave considerable room for interpretation and often require
value judgments, making them prone to ambiguity as well as interpretive
disagreement. As Joseph Raz has argued, an important difference between
rules and the principles or policies that justify them is that the latter "tend
to be more vague and less certain."103 Moreover, a particular purpose of
justification is likely to cover a greater range of situations than a
particular rule (which typically picks out a specific situation type and
prescribes particular conduct in that situation) and many justifications
might apply with similar strength to a particular case; the deliberation that
purposes encourage is accordingly more complex and extensive than
rules-based deliberation.
Even if the purpose behind a past decision can be located without much
difficulty, it might be more difficult to determine what action or outcome
the purpose requires. For example, if I have a dispute with my neighbor
over noise levels, I can easily tell which of us is the silence-lover and
which the noise-maker. Let's say that I am the silence-lover and he the
noise-maker. And suppose I have knowledge of a previous case involving
a noise dispute between neighbors where the silence-lover prevailed. If
the courts follow a rule-based approach to precedent, I know I am in luck.
If the courts follow a purposive approach though, it is unlikely that I can
be so sure. The purpose behind the holdings of the previous cases might
be to make the least-cost avoider pay the price. I would likely have a
difficult time determining who, between my neighbor and me, is the least-
cost avoider.
(b) Equality
If low-level equality matters-roughly, treating person A the same as B
if they performed the same actions-then a purposive approach is
unlikely to be ideal in terms of equality. This is because treating people
equally at the low level does not guarantee equality at the high-level, and
sometimes requires unequal treatment at the high-level.1 04 On the higher-
level conception of equality, where someone is entitled to the same
outcome another person received on grounds of equality only if the
rationale behind granting the outcome to the first person applies in the
103. Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits ofLaw, 81 YALE L. J. 823, 841 (1972).
104. See supra, Part I, Sec. B.2., for a discussion of low- versus high-level equality.
2018] 95
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol30/iss2/1
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
case of the second person, a purposive model of stare decisis looks
promising on equality grounds. Since I believe that treating people
equally at the level of principle or policy is most or all of what matters for
equality as a value, I think that the purposive approach to precedent is
well aligned with the equality justification for stare decisis. This assumes,
though, that adjudicators can extract purposes effectively from past cases
and apply them appropriately to novel cases. Some adjudicators
undoubtedly can, at least in some cases.
Here is an example. In the New York case of Hynes v. New York
Central Railroad, a child was preparing to dive into public waters from a
plank, when a pole supporting electric wires fell on top of him.105 The
child was electrocuted, knocked from the plank, and killed. The defendant
railroad company owned the plank, pole, and wires, but the plank
extended for more than seven feet over the water. The lower courts held
that the child was a trespasser and that accordingly the defendant was not
liable for injuries to the child. 106 As Justice Cardozo explained in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals (New York's highest court), the courts
below "thought it of no significance that [the plaintiff] would have met
the same fate if he had been below the board and not above it." 10 7 He
criticized the formalistic reasoning that generated a conclusion in favor of
the defendant. 08
Cardozo targeted the intermediate court's application of an ancient
doctrinal rule whereby the title to a structure is unaffected by the
protrusion of that structure beyond the title-holder's land. The protrusion
rule was developed in cases involving branches of fruit-bearing trees that
extended beyond the land of the tree-owners: the opinions of those cases
held that the tree-owner maintained property rights to the whole tree,
despite the encroachment. The intermediate court reasoned that under this
rule the plank remained the property of the defendant, that accordingly the
child was a trespasser, and that therefore the defendant was not liable. On
this line of reasoning, if wires were to fall on two children, where one of
them happened to be in a stream below a tree owned by the wire-owner
and the other happened to be perched on a lower bough of the tree, then
the owner is liable only to the former child. 109 However, whatever
rationale we might have for protecting the child under the tree extends to
105. Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229 (1921).
106. This was before the rise of the attractive nuisance doctrine.
107. Id. at 232.
108. Id. at 233 ("The conclusion is defended with much subtlety of reasoning, with much
insistence upon its inevitableness as a merely logical deduction"; and, "[tihis case is a striking
instance of the dangers of ... the extension of a maxim or definition with relentless disregard of
consequences to a 'dryly logical extreme."').
109. Judge Cardozo proposed the hypothetical, which is based on another New York case-
Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201 (1872). Id. at 234.
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the child on the tree, just as it would extend to a child swimming in public
waters and also to the child on the plank in the case at hand. If we want to
protect children who are playing in public spaces, it ought to make no
difference whether those children are on top of some structure that is
formally private property. Whether or not a plaintiff in such a case is a
trespasser, the defendant created a public hazard and ought accordingly to
be liable for the resulting harms. Cardozo rejected a formulaic rule-based
approach to precedent in favor of one based on higher-order principles,
reaching a result that seems irreproachable on comparative justice
grounds.
(c) Appropriate Distribution of Power
A system of precedent constrains judicial discretion to some extent
whether or not higher-order purposes are in the picture, but a method that
excludes or limits the role of purposes will likely constrain judicial
decisions to a greater extent than one that prioritizes the role of purposes.
This is because the latter approach depends on the consideration of
higher-level, more abstract concepts, which often allow for significant
ranges of interpretation and are prone to interpretive disagreement.
Take a precedential rule that bars a prospective inheritor from receiving
his inheritance in the event that he has murdered his testator, where the
purpose or justification for the rule is that the law should not reward
wrongdoers. 110 If a legal reasoner who seeks to follow the precedent
makes her decision based on the rule's purpose, she would have to
interpret the meaning of wrong, which would seem to open up a greater
range of possible meanings (and allow for greater disagreement) than, for
example, the terms testator or murder. To the extent, then, that we have
limited trust in courts, and believe that judicial decision making should be
constrained, we have good reason to limit the degree to which high-level
rationales enter precedential reasoning.'
(d) Credibility
A system that is consistent first and foremost at the level of low-level
concepts might appear more legitimate than a system that tolerates low-
level inconsistency and prioritizes consistency at a higher level. For one,
low-level inconsistency might be more visible than inconsistency at the
level of rationale. Moreover, if Sunstein and others are right in their
conjecture that people are more likely to agree on outcomes given some
110. The example is based on the famous New York civil court case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115
N.Y. 506 (1889).
111. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 387 (explaining that, "bottom-up, case to case reasoning is
generally associated with lower levels of trust, than reasoning based on high-level principles").
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set of facts than they are to agree on the principles that would justify such
outcomes, then a system of precedent focused on facts and rulings might
be capable of generating substantial agreement even where people
disagree at the level of rationale.
However, the rote application of rules is sometimes blatantly unjust;
when legal authorities enforce rules without regard to the rationales
behind those rules or the consequences of their enforcement, rules can
work to reduce the credibility of the legal system broadly. Monica Bell
has documented several examples of young black people whom police
officers have targeted unjustly for violating legal rules. For example, one
individual was cited for "loitering or some other minor offense" while he
was waiting outside his younger brother's school toward the end of the
school day, so that he could accompany his brother home.11 2 In another
example, an officer stopped a group of young black people for breaking a
Maryland state law against walking in the street.1 13 Presumably, the
purpose of this law is public safety. The young people were in the street
because, as one of them explained, it was safer under the circumstances to
walk in the street than on the sidewalk.11 4 In these examples, although the
individuals were technically violating rules, they were doing so with
defensible purposes in mind. Moreover, the purposes behind the rules did
not apply under the circumstances. When authorities ignore higher-order
rationales in this type of situation, the legitimacy of the legal system
suffers.
(e) Judicial Efficiency
If the rationales underlying judicial decisions were to constitute binding
law, the judicial decision-making process would likely be highly
resource-intensive, particularly if no additional material was binding
along with those rationales. Many potential principles might be relevant to
the decision of a case. And often principles can be found that point in
opposite directions. 15 Moreover, if we keep purposes out of precedent,
then judges with differing views on the justifications for some treatment
of a case might still be able to agree on the outcome. Different judges, and
different courts, might disagree on the rationale for a ruling, or the values
112. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L. J.




115. Dworkin argued that this is a key distinguishing feature between principles and rules:
principles take on varying weights and can compete with one another; in contrast, rules are either
applicable or not in an all-or-nothing manner and no two valid rules can conflict with one another.
Supra, note 7 at 43. However, Raz has argued to the contrary that valid legal rules can prescribe
opposing outcomes in a case. Raz, supra note 103 at 830-32.
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it stands for, but still agree that the ruling is correct. 116 This might save
time and energy, since judges would not need to convince each other of
the principles or policies that their legal decisions should be serving.
Theorists who recommend a method of precedent where judges engage
directly with stare decisis values place a great deal of faith in the abilities
and virtues of adjudicators. Judges would consider which of all past
decisions should govern a novel case as well as how those decisions
should govern by consulting the totality of values that justify the doctrine
of precedent. Even if someone were capable of the task, the reasoning
would take a great deal of time and effort-likely more than judges have
at their disposal when they decide cases.
Consequently, I imagine that an enlightened adjudicator would come up
with some method to make judgments about precedent easier on judicial
resources and good for the other stare decisis values as well. In that event,
we would be back where we started: trying to come up with a method of
precedent that is optimal in terms of the justifying principles behind the
doctrine. Finally, even if there are some Herculean judges, we cannot
reasonably expect this degree of skill and virtue from all judges;
accordingly, we would want an alternative method, one that we could
reasonably expect decision-makers to employ successfully.
E. The Rule-Based Model
(1) Definition and Examples
The basic idea behind the rule-based model is that precedents or lines of
precedent establish rules, which courts are obligated to apply in
subsequent disputes. On this view, when judges follow precedent, they
exercise deductive reasoning. The past case lays out the rule in a form
such as the following:
If A, B, C, and not-D, then 0; where A, B, C, and D are
generalized facts, and 0 is the outcome (typically a holding for
plaintiff or defendant).
This is a compelling and intuitive understanding of the operation of
precedent in the common law.117 Judicial opinions often treat precedents
116. Shapiro makes the same point in the context of statutory rules: if a rule is kept distinct from
its purposes, then that rule can satisfy a diversity of higher-order principles, even when those
principles are in tension; accordingly, a rule laid out in a statute might not be indicative of higher-
order agreement among those who settled on the rule. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 380.
117. My target here is a non-strict version of the rule-based view, where precedents are
distinguishable, which seems to be the most widely accepted version. See Horty, Rules and Reasons
in the Theory ofPrecedent, supra note 59 at 2. On the less popular strict rule view, precedents are not
distinguishable; the strict view has been developed by Larry Alexander. See Alexander, supra note
59; Alexander, Precedent, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (D.
Patterson ed., 1996), at 503-513; LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULES OF RULES:
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as though they stand for rules, which are to be applied deductively to new
cases.
For example, in Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, the well-known
spermatic cord severance case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rearticulated, and applied, a rule "well established" by previous case law:
"where a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation
alternative situations and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should
be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to decide
before the doctor proceeds with the operation."118 The opinion then
clarified as follows: "we mean that, in a situation such as the case before
us where no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed
before the operation that if his spermatic cords were severed it would
result in his sterilization . . .."1l9 The court concluded that, if the facts
alleged by plaintiff were true, then the physician defendant was liable for
failure to obtain consent. 120 We can simplify the reasoning here as
follows:
IfA and B and (not-C or not-D), then hold for plaintiff where A=
physician could ascertain chance of alternative situations in
advance of the operation; B = no immediate emergency existed; C
= patient was informed of alternative possibilities; D = patient
had chance to decide.
The rule tells us that, if the antecedent is true, the defendant is liable.
When a new case arises, the court has the task of determining whether or
not the facts fall under the terms of the rule.
Judges often generate or derive rules, and so "follow," past cases, even
when no rules are explicitly delimited in those past cases. On Goodhart's
rule-based view, precedential rules are not generally stated as such in the
opinions of precedent case; a precedential rule consists of the facts treated
by the precedent judge as material together with the outcome of the
case. 12 1 For Goodhart, it does not matter what a judge says or even thinks
is the rule at play; to determine the precedential effect of a case we must
isolate only and all the material facts of the case, plus the case's outcome.
Goodhart emphatically rejects the idea that the reasons behind a
judicial decision play any role in the precedential effect of the decision. 122
MORALITY, RULES & THE DILEMMAS OF LAw (2001).
118. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 434 (1958).
119. Id. (emphasis added). See also City of Buffalo v. Cargill, 374 N.E.2d 372, 378 (1978),
where the court clearly articulated a rule from a past case (Matter of Ueck, 286 N.Y. 1, 35 N.E.2d
624) and took that rule to control in the case at hand-stating that, "the rule announced in Ueck is to
be followed."
120. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against defendant, and
ordered a new trial to determine the facts.
121. See Goodhart, supra note 11.
122. Others, however, have developed rule-based approaches that seem to leave space for the
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Rather, the process of reasoning from precedent involves finding the
material facts of the past case and then determining whether those
material facts are present in the new case. "If these are identical," says
Goodhart,
then the first case is a binding precedent for the second, and the
court must reach the same conclusion as it did in the first one. If
the first case lacks any material fact or contains any additional
ones not found in the second, then it is not a direct precedent.1 2 3
Goodhart does not offer a method for distinguishing the material facts
from the immaterial; he notes only that if an opinion does not state which
facts are material, "then all the facts set forth in the opinion must be
considered material with the exception of those that on their face are
immaterial."l 24 Some facts mentioned in court opinions are undeniably
irrelevant to the legal claims at issue; perhaps Goodhart just means that
we should exclude these, and only these, when deriving a rule from an
opinion where the material and immaterial facts are not explicitly
established as such.
H.L.A. Hart adopted a type of rule-based account, but he made an
exception for "penumbral" cases; these are cases with facts that do not fit
inside the core meaning of terms given in existing rules.1 25 For example,
suppose a new case arises in the jurisdiction of Bang v. Charles T Miller
Hosp. (the spermatic cord severance case): let's say the facts of this new
case are basically the same as in Bang, except that in the new case the
operation was more urgent. The doctor had a finite amount of time, one to
two hours, to complete the operation safely. The doctor argues that this
was an emergency situation and that therefore the Bang rule does not
apply. However, it is not clear that it was an emergency situation; the
emergency character of the situation might be indeterminate. Even though
there are cases squarely in the emergency category, and cases outside of it
(such as Bang), the new case might be neither an emergency nor a non-
emergency. In that event it would be a penumbral case with respect to the
concept of emergency.
On Hart's view, judges inevitably exercise discretion when it comes to
resolving penumbral disputes; in these cases, rules themselves do not
determine outcomes.1 26 Problems of the penumbra arise because of the
open-textured nature of legal concepts: open-textured terms have a "core
possibility that reasons (principles or policies that justify outcomes) operate as terms of rules. See
Joseph Raz, Law and Value in Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 180 (1979). We might think
of this approach as one that combines purposive and rule-based methods.
123. Id. at 180.
124. Id. at 178.
125. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 12-13, 123, 251 (Leslie Green, ed, 2012).
126. See id. at 127; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 251.
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of settled meaning" but also furry-edged boundaries. Consequently,
although there are many determinate instances of any legal term, instances
falling within the settled core, there are also borderline instances. When a
case includes a factor that is penumbral with respect to a term in some
rule, judges must exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to apply
the rule (and this is regardless of whether it is a statutory or common-law
rule).127 Hart's indeterminacy, though, is a marginal phenomenon; most
cases are not penumbral and instead fit neatly into the legal rules set out
in statutes and precedents.
(2) Evaluation of the Rule-Based Model
(a) Reliance
Rules are relatively effective at producing predictable outcomes. Here I
have adopted what I take to be a common-sense conception of rules as
relatively low-level constructs, which tell rule-followers what do to or
how ,to act under specified sets of circumstances. They are more closely
tailored to behavior than the policies or principles that might justify them,
and are more conducive than those policies or principles "to uniform and
predictable application." 1 28 On the rule-based model, precedents take the
form of instructions for how to act; this is not the case with any of the
other models I examine here.
(b) Equality
Lamond offers a criticism of the rule model that sounds a lot like
Moore's criticism of interpretive methods in general. On a rule-based
approach, a precedent "restricts the later court in a fairly haphazard
manner, turning on what facts happened to be present in the precedent
case (or, more precisely, which facts are mentioned in the precedent
case)."l 29 The presence or absence of such facts are not necessarily
relevant for equality as a matter of justice.
Schauer has argued similarly that rules in general (not just in the legal
context) inevitably neglect differences that are relevant and pick out
127. See Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the "Open Texture" of Language, 10 LAW & PHIL. 51
(1991) for an extensive account of the role of open-textured concepts in Hart's theory of precedent.
See Brewer, supra note 86, at 1000, for an account of open-textured terms more generally and their
prevalence in Western law.
128. See Section D.2 of this Part. See also SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 137, 181-2, 137 (noting
that legal systems tend to justify their dependence on precedent by appealing to many of the same
merits that rule-based decision making in general is known for, and suggesting that "the protection of
reliance interests is the most common argument in favor of rules"); Raz, supra note 103, at 841.
129. Lamond, supra note 95, at 11.
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differences that are irrelevant when applied to particular cases.130 If we
want to be sure to treat people equally, says Schauer, we need a
particularist method, which does not depend on any generalizations: only
particularism can draw "all the distinctions some substantive justification
indicates ought to be drawn."13' He concludes that, "[i]f we are searching
for arguments to support rule-based decision-making . . . we will have to
search elsewhere than in the moral force of consistency, fairness, or
justice."1 32 However, often we do not have available substantive
justifications that would indicate, in the absence of rules, where we ought
to make distinctions between cases-and, even when we do have access
to such justifications, they might be too abstract or involved to reason
from reliably. If we had more time, information, and intelligence with
which to make decisions, then it might be that a particularist method
would best serve the kind of equality that matters for justice. Given the
limited resources with which courts make decisions, particularism does
not seem promising in the context of the common law.
A rule-based method of precedent would likely require judges, in some
instances, to make decisions based on a set of factors that is not the most
directly relevant set from the perspective of equality (for example,
consider the reasoning of the lower courts in Hynel33 ). Accordingly, it
might seem as though a rule-based method is insensitive to the
requirements of the equality principle. However, acting with the
conscious intent of serving some purpose is not the only way to serve that
purpose and might not even be the best way to serve it. By applying a rule
in a present dispute that was applied in past disputes, a judge might make
a decision that is consistent with the principle of equality (and also
consistent with the first-order principle behind the rule), without
deliberately acting on or following those principles. The judge's decision
could successfully realize equality, even though that principle did not
enter her reasoning directly. I
If an authority has greater expertise than its subjects (those who follow
its directives) or has better motivations, then the conduct that the authority.
orders will better realize the values underlying those rules than its subjects
could or anyway would on their own. Effective authorities issue rules
with the following property: subjects will better realize the values
underlying the rules if they just follow the rules rather than trying to
realize the values directly.1 34 Accordingly, although a rule might appear to
130. SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 136.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 138.
133. See supra Part 11, Sec. D.2.
134. See RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 191-94 (1999).
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a rule-follower to be unprincipled or ungrounded, following the rule
might be the best way to realize worthy objectives. 135
Nevertheless, precedents as rules will not necessarily pick out factors
that are relevant for the purposes of equal treatment. Moreover, rules can
function to conceal purposes or rationales that would not withstand public
scrutiny.136 Although rules are potentially useful devices for the
realization of equality, nothing about their character ensures that they will
be used for that end.
(c) Appropriate Distribution ofPower
Stare decisis is supposed to support a particular distribution of power in
which past cases have authority over new cases, and higher courts have
authority over lower courts. One manifestation of that authority is the
constraint that past decisions place on present decisions. As other have
shown, the issuance of rules is a common and effective way for
authorities to restrict and control their subjects' decision making; rules
work to exclude some reasons for action from the consideration of the
rule-follower-reasons that, in the absence of the rule, would be relevant
for the agent to consider.137
Some commentators have stressed that in any given case judges decide
only the particular dispute at issue and that subsequent courts have to
make their own generalizations in finding the "rule" of the precedent;
accordingly, precedents cannot really contain rules, and subsequent courts
have a great deal of discretion in constructing the rules for which
precedents stand. As Schauer explains, on this view, "[w]hat distinguishes
reasoning from precedent from reasoning from rule . .. is the necessity in
precedential reasoning of constructing the generalization/factual predicate
that already exists in the case of a rule."138 However, this kind of
generalization typically does already exist in the case of precedents; it
would be very awkward if not impossible for an opinion to discuss the
facts of its case without making any generalizations. Courts typically state
their decisions in the form of propositions general enough that they can be
applied, more or less in the same form, to subsequent disputes. 139
135. I discuss this property of rules in more detail, and from an empirical perspective, in Part III,
Sec. B.i.b., infra.
136. See my discussion of credibility and the purposive model supra, this Part, Section D.2.a.
137. See SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 76, 159 (arguing that rules "operate as tools for the
allocation of power"). See also RAz, supra note 134, at 59 (citing the reasons given in JOHN STUART
MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 519 (1851), for having rules: "'they
point out the manner in which it will be least perilous to act, where time or means do not exist for
analyzing the actual circumstances of the case, or where we cannot trust our judgment in estimating
them').
138. SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 183.
139. For an alternative description of this view, see SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 185.
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(d) Credibility
Ordinary citizens are generally accustomed to, and seem to be
comfortable with, perceiving the law-including the common law-as a
set of rules. In both everyday speech and the legal sphere we refer to rules
even where no statutes are implicated. This perception of the common law
as a set of rules might be difficult to maintain if rules did not in fact
govern common law disputes. Moreover, rules are generally perceived as
an appropriate means for institutions and individuals in positions of power
to exercise their authority. Rules give the appearance that they are capable
of generating impartial results in a way that many other methods-for
example, direct analogy or policy-based Realism-do not. For these
reasons, a rule-based method of precedent might help promote the
credibility of the judiciary and the legal system more broadly.
However, on some occasions blatant incongruities exist between rules
and their purposes; when authorities insist on enforcing the rules anyway,
the result appears (and might well be) unjust.1 40 Accordingly, the
application of a strict rule-based method of precedent in some cases will
likely damage the perceived legitimacy of the legal system.
(e) Judicial Efficiency
Given that rules exclude certain reasons from consideration, a decision
based on a rule should be easier to make than a decision unconstrained by
rules. As Schauer puts it, "when a decision-maker decides according to
rules and therefore relies on decisions made by others, she is practically
freed from the responsibility of scrutinizing every substantively relevant
feature of the event."'41 Rules therefore streamline deliberative efforts,
and accordingly help to conserve decision-making resources, including
time and labor.1 42 However, narrower norms are subject to quicker
depreciation or irrelevance than more general norms; as Landes and
Posner have argued, "[a] general precedent is less likely to be rendered
obsolete by a change in the social or legal environment in which the
precedent is applied." 43 Accordingly, even though rules are generally
easier to apply than principles, rules might require judicial revision and
replacement-which is taxing on judicial resources-more often than
principles.
In this Part, I evaluated various models of precedential interpretation
according to how well a practice of precedent that matched the model
140. See my discussion of credibility and the purposive model supra, Sec. D.2. of this Part.
141. SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 145.
142. RAZ, supra note 134, at 59, at 59.
143. Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 268.
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would serve the justifying principles of stare decisis. My analyses have
revealed that these principles are in tension with one another: when a
method of interpretation does well for one value, that success often comes
at the expense of another value. Moreover, although one method might
align well with one of the values in some contexts, in other contexts the
same method might defeat that value. These findings make it difficult to
settle on a single method of interpreting and applying precedent that is
worth endorsing. If we wish to use the set of basic principles I have
identified (or some similar set) to justify precedent, we might have to
accept that interpreters of precedent should employ different methods
depending on the context. Nevertheless, some of the methods that I have
examined here do better overall than others to satisfy the values
underlying stare decisis. Rule-based and purposive models are generally
superior to policy-based Realism, direct analogy, and balance of factors.
The chart below summarizes my evaluations, providing a rough estimate
of how well each model does according to each value.
VALUES OR GOALS OF STARE DECISIS
FciJuicial
Policy-
Based Moderate Low Very low Mode rate Low
eBalance of
MoeaeLVery lowowodewatryLo
rModerate to Low to Low to LowLhigh moderate moderate
urn High ~Low to oderate to odrate to Hgmoderat hihDig
[Vol. 30:2106
45
Varsava: How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for following
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Varsava
III. OPTIONS FOR FOLLOWING PRECEDENT
I take on three tasks in this final Part of the paper. First, I further
support my claim that we have reason to question the ability of any one
method of precedent to realize the main values of stare decisis. Second,
with a focus on the key value of equality or fairness, I explore how the
optimal method of following precedent might change depending on the
context of a case. Third, I suggest that a system of precedent might not be
worth it in some domains of judicial decision making and in particular in
the context of statutory interpretation.
A. Value Trade-Offs
My conclusion that no single method of following precedent does
particularly well on the totality of key stare decisis values is consistent
with various other studies on the advantages and disadvantages of
different types of legal norm. For example, in an empirical study of
regulatory contexts, Colin Diver evaluates the relative merits of different
types of administrative rule. 144 He divides rule-types according to their
degree of precision, and evaluates each type according to how well it does
on the following: (1) "congruency" (how well does the rule realize the
rule-setters' policy objectives?); (2) "transparency" (how well-defined
and universally understandable are the terms of the rule?) and (3)
"accessibility" (how easy is it for the rule's intended audience to apply the
rule to concrete situations?).1 45
Diver sets out to determine the optimal degree of regulatory precision
for administrative rules. Through an examination of actual rules in various
contexts, where the rules differ in degree of precision, he finds that the
optimal precision for administrative rules depends on the "peculiar
statutory or doctrinal context in which they arise" and in particular
"variables peculiar to the rule's author, enforcer, and addressee." 46 Diver
notes significant trade-offs among his values of interest: for example, he
finds that transparency "is usually bought at the price of incongruity ...
."147 Diver's analysis leads him to conclude that, "generalizations about
optimal rule precision are inherently suspect." 4 8
More generally, there is considerable disagreement among legal experts
as to whether and in what contexts standards (open-ended or broad rules)
are preferable to more precise and narrow rules.149 Given the similarities,
144. Colin Diver, The optimal precision ofadministrative rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983).
145. Id. at 67.
146. Id. at 107.
147. Id. at 91.
148. Id. at 65.
149. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 590-99
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and perhaps overlap, between standards and what I call the justificatory
purposes behind rules, it -is unsurprising that some of the value trade-offs
between using standards and using narrow rules are the same as the trade-
offs between a purposive method of precedent and a rule-based method.
Most notably, even if the narrower type of norm often makes for more
predictable outcomes, it does so at the expense of precision and
consistency in realizing the values underlying the rules-accordingly,
narrow norms sometimes produce unfair results. 0
B. Multiple Methods
In the remainder of this Part, I set value trade-offs aside. I suggest that
even if we are concerned with only one of the stare decisis values, we
would be better off with multiple methods of precedent rather than a fixed
method for all cases.
In a study similar to Diver's, John Braithwaite evaluates rules against
principles, but based only on their relative value in terms of reliance.
Braithwaite uses the term principle to refer to norms that are more general
or open-ended than the type of norm he refers to as a rule; however, he
also conceives of principles as norms that justify rules, and he considers
advantages of principles and rules factoring together into a norm-
follower's deliberative process."'
Through case studies of diverse regulatory contexts (oversight of
nursing homes in the U.S. and Australia, nuclear plant operation on Three
Mile Island, and oversight of a coal mine), Braithwaite finds that, on
reliance grounds alone, sometimes rules are preferable to principles and
sometimes principles are preferable to rules. He calls into question the
traditional assumption that "tightly specified rules increase legal
certainty."1 52 In particular, he suggests that narrow rules do better at
protecting reliance interests when the regulatory context is relatively
simple; as contexts get more complex, principles do better and at some
point gain an edge over rules. Moreover, where principles are preferable
to rules, binding principles supporting non-binding rules are better still.'53
Braithwaite's conclusions are broadly consonant with Diver's. Are
narrower norms better than more open-ended ones in the regulatory
context? It depends.
(1988); see also Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in Philosophical Foundations of
Language in the Law (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, eds. 2011), for a discussion of value trade-
offs between more and less vague legal norms.
150. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89.8 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1689 (1976).
151. John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty. 27 AUSTL. J. LEG.
PHIL. 47 (2002).
152. Id. at 50.
153. Id. at 75.
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(1) Four Case Studies in Legal Reasoning
Here I focus on the value of equality or fairness, and analyze four
different legal contexts with the aim of determining what kind of
precedential interpretation would do best for equality in each context. I
show that different settings call for different methods for following
precedent on grounds of fairness alone. The optimal method depends on
the circumstances of the case and its relationship to past cases. In my
equality analysis, I appeal to intuitions about the requirements of fair
treatment in well-specified situations; I try to avoid making broad claims
about fairness that would commit me to a controversial theory of equality.
(a) When Rules Defeat their Purposes
When respecting a rule would defeat the purpose behind the rule, a
purposive method of precedential interpretation is at least defensible, and
plausibly optimal, on grounds of equality. If we assume that rules
generally serve their purposes then, when people follow rules, they reap
the benefits of those purposes. When people obediently walk on the
sidewalk rather than in the street, they are better off because- walking on
the sidewalk is safer. It would be unfair to disallow some individuals that
same benefit by compelling them to follow the letter of a rule when
following the rule would be harmful to their safety.
I am thinking of the type of scenario we saw already in an example
from Bell's study of unfair treatment by the police. A few young black
people were walking together on a street late at night when they were
stopped by a law enforcement officer, who reprimanded them for
breaking a law against walking in streets. The purpose of that law is
presumably to protect public safety. The individuals whom the officer
stopped were walking in the street for the sake of their safety. It would
have been more dangerous for them to walk on the dark sidewalk, which
was lined with bushes, than in the empty and better-lit street. If the police,
or a court, were to enforce the rule (using a rule-based method), they
would contradict the very purpose behind the rule-the purpose that is
served in the majority of cases to which the rule applies.
In this case, the contradiction is relatively transparent. The officer
would not need to engage in involved deliberation to see the problem,
especially since the young people walking in the street offered reasons for
their conduct. Moreover, the reasons that one would walk in the street
under the circumstances are simple and straightforward; ostensible law-
violators would not need a sophisticated or complex argument to defend
their conduct. I think that the obviousness part is important since
otherwise this pathway to purposive interpretation would introduce
opportunities for sophisticated disputants to game the system and for
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judges to exercise considerable discretion-which can itself be harmful to
equality. Moreover, the point is not to ensure that rules always align
perfectly with their purposes, but only to prevent gross incongruities.
Courts would have the task of determining whether a dispute warrants a
purposive approach. As a preliminary matter, in order to open the door to
purposive interpretation on the grounds that a rule contradicts its own
purposes, the purposes behind a rule should be readily accessible and
widely agreed upon. But the court would still have to determine whether
the contradiction is sufficiently obvious-perhaps for this purpose it could
use a common-sense obviousness standard.
Indeed, courts have adopted purposive interpretive methods when a
rule-based method generates openly perverse outcomes. In the canonical
case of Tedla v. Ellman, the New York Court of Appeals pointed out that,
"[s]eldom have the courts held that failure to observe a rule of the road,
even though embodied in a statute, constitutes negligence as matter of law
where observance would subject a person to danger which might be
avoided by disregard of the general rule."1 5 4 In Tedla, the question for the
court was whether the plaintiffs should bear the cost of their own injuries
under the rule of negligence per se, given that they had apparently acted
in violation of a statutory rule."' A vehicle struck the plaintiffs while they
were walking on a road in the same direction as traffic. The statutory rule
prohibited pedestrians from walking on the right side of the road.
However, the facts of this case revealed that 'there were very few cars
going east' at the time of the accident, but that going west there was 'very
heavy Sunday night traffic.' 1 5 6 As the court suggested, no one could
reasonably deny that walking in the direction of traffic under the
circumstances was the safer and therefore more prudent alternative for
pedestrians to take."
The point of the negligence per se rule is to penalize imprudent
behavior; if the plaintiffs in Tedla were found to be negligent per se, the
rule would penalize the contrary. The court explains that "under usual
circumstances" pedestrians who disobeyed the rule against walking on the
left side of the road would be negligent as a matter of law if they were hit
by a vehicle.1 8 They would have acted imprudently, or it would be
reasonable to assume they had acted imprudently. However, the
circumstances of this case were unusual; "when the unusual occurs, strict
observance may defeat the purpose of the rule and produce catastrophic
154. Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 131-32 (1939). While this case involved statutory
interpretation, the same reasoning would apply to a purely common law case.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 128.
157. Id. at 128-34.
158. Id. at 130.
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results."1 59 If the court were to hold them liable for their own injuries
under the doctrine of per se negligence, the court not only would fail to
serve the clear purpose of the doctrine; by penalizing prudent conduct and
encouraging imprudence, the court would contradict that purpose. If the
purpose of a rule is clear and applies to the majority of cases, it is unfair,
and I think unjustifiable, to enforce the rule against an individual when
doing so would openly contradict that purpose.
For a common law example from a different context, take the
traditional warranty rule, which was meant to protect consumers. The
New Jersey case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors involved a dispute
between defendant car dealer (Bloomfield) and plaintiff automobile
purchaser (Henningsen) over the effect of an express warranty, the terms
of which explicitly disclaimed an implied warranty of merchantability.16 0
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the express warranty was
invalid because the warranty contradicted the very purpose of enforceable
warranties. As the court explained, "[w]arranties developed in the law in
the interest of and to protect the ordinary consumer."'61 The effect of the
warranty in question would be to protect the interests of the seller at the
expense of consumer protection, since it would absolve the seller of legal
responsibility for defects in the product that a consumer could not be
expected to recognize in advance of purchase.
Clever manufacturers and dealers took advantage of the law of
warranties to undermine consumer protection. The New Jersey court
recognized this practice and, in an effort to counteract it, gave the
warranty doctrine a purposive interpretation. This meant that some parties
were treated unequally across time-Bloomfield was prohibited from
benefiting from the predatory practice, whereas presumably earlier courts
had permitted some sellers to benefit from the same practice, given that
courts had traditionally taken a non-purposive approach to the rule.1 62
However, Bloomfield was sufficiently differently situated from the
majority of past merchant litigants, who had not devised warranties
disclaiming implied merchantability, to justify different treatment without
unduly contravening equality.
(b) When Rules are Tried and Tested
A purpose-based interpretation, with the purpose trumping the rule
itself, is not necessarily ideal in terms of equality. In many cases, a rule
such as the walking-in-streets rule should just be taken to mean that it is
159. Id.
160. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 (1960).
161. Id.at375.
162. See, e.g., the U.K. case L'Estrange v. F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 (K.B.) 394.
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illegal to walk in the street and the rule should be either enforced to that
effect, or not enforced, across the board. If a rule is generally consistent
with its purposes-if it is well designed-then a rule-based method of
interpretation and application will likely do better than a purposive
method to serve the rule's purposes and to do so consistently. This
counterintuitive result has been demonstrated empirically in various
contexts. For example, when dieters adopt a norm against eating left-
overs for the purpose of losing weight, they will be more successful at
losing weight if they employ a rule-based method of interpretation-that
is, if they take the intention just as a prescription against eating left-
overs-as opposed to a purpose-based interpretation-do not eat left-
overs because that will serve the purpose of losing weight.163 The
awareness of the reason for the prescribed action is counter-productive:
dieters do better if they do not consider the point of the rule in the process
of following it.164 When it comes to tried and tested rules, we might
reasonably expect litigants to receive equal treatment-in the sense that
they are treated consistently at the level of rule and purpose-if judges
focus on applying the rule and set the purpose aside.
Indicators that a common law rule is well-designed-that it consistently
serves its purposes over the range of scenarios it covers-include that the
legislature has not changed or replaced the rule, even though it has had
opportunity to do so, and that higher courts have continued to apply the
rule even though they have had opportunity to adjust or overturn it. If a
rule has been subjected to repeated testing, then the factors it picks out are
unlikely to be inconsistent with the principles behind the rule, or arbitrary
in the way that, for example, Moore fears rules inevitably will be. 165 If
legal authorities deliberate on the purposes behind rules whenever they
enforce those rules, they will have more room to exercise discretion in
determining outcomes. Given the prevalence of racial, gender, and other
biases, when it comes to tried and tested rules in more or less normal
circumstances, a rule-based method of interpretation might be the most
promising for the purpose of equality or fairness.
(c) When Rules have Unclear or Inconsistent Purposes
Sometimes when courts employ purposive interpretations of a doctrine
163. See Richard Holton, We Don't Torture: Moral Resolutions, Temptation, and the Doctrine of
Double Effect, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), for a theoretical discussion of this
phenomenon and possible applications in the realm of morality. For empirical findings in the weight-
loss and other contexts, see Peter M. Gollwitzer, Frank Wieber, Andrea L. Myers, & Sean M.
McCrea, How to Maximize Implementation Intention Effects, in THEN A MIRACLE OCCURS: FOCUSING
ON BEHAVIOR ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND RESEARCH 137 (2009).
164. I offered a conceptual account of this feature of rules already, in Part II, Sec. E.2., supra.
165. See my discussion of Moore's view supra, Part II, Sec. D.1.
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the method seems unfair because the purposes they invoke are either
unclear or inconsistent with other plausible purposes behind the doctrine.
When the facts of a case fall squarely under some doctrinal rule, but the
purposes behind that rule are debatable or in conflict with other purposes
that could reasonably guide the case, a court that seeks to maximize
equality should take a rule-based approach to precedent.
For example, consider the famous New York case, of Riggs v. Palmer,
where a prospective inheritor, Elmer Palmer, had murdered his
grandfather with the object of effectuating the grandfather's will. 166 This
case revolved largely around the interpretation of statutes, but the feature
of the case that I am interested in can arise just as well in cases based on
the interpretation of precedent. The New York Court of Appeals (the
highest New York state court) rejected a rule-based interpretative method,
and turned instead to the purposes behind the will statutes as well as
common law purposes or principles broadly.
The majority opinion acknowledged that, "statutes regulating the
making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property, if
literally construed, . . . give this property to the murderer." 67
Nevertheless, the Court determined that the murderer was not entitled to
his inheritance. According to Judge Earl, writing for the majority, the law
governing wills was meant "to enable testators to dispose of their estates
to the objects of their bounty at death, and to carry into effect their final
wishes legally expressed; and in considering and giving effect to them this
purpose must be kept in view."1 68 For Judge Earl, "it never could have
been [the legislators'] intention that a donee who murdered the testator to
make the will operative should have any benefit under it."169 Accordingly,
allowing the murderer in this case to benefit from the will would not
fulfill the true purpose of the will rule.
The majority assumed, I think reasonably, that the testator would not
have maintained as a final wish that his own murderer would collect an
inheritance from him; given that the purpose of the law of wills is to
fulfill the wishes and intentions of testators, Elmer Palmer should not be
granted any inheritance, despite the language of the will in question.
However, reasonable people could and in fact did disagree about the
purpose of the law governing wills. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gray
insisted that the purpose of the statutory rules is to impose "strict and
systematic" safeguards around "the execution, alteration and revocation"
166. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
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of wills.170 On the dissent's view, the majority opinion undermines the
purpose of the rules governing wills."'
Why does any of this matter for equality? The purposive approach
generates conflicting results in the same case. If another case arises with
the same facts, and a court uses a purposive method of interpretation, it
may or may not arrive at the same result as the majority in Riggs.
Moreover, the purpose that the majority relied on is not one that had been
consistently applied in similar past cases, which involved the
interpretation of the same kind of rules. 172 Wills often do not represent the
final intentions of the deceased. Testators might, and probably often do,
change their minds about their preferred inheritance schemes without
recording the change in their wills; for example, they might not get
around to making the change. If a testator does not record such a change,
then the terms of the will as recorded will likely stand (even, presumably,
in the event that there is evidence of a change in preference). So it seems
that Elmer Palmer was treated differently. Perhaps he should have been
treated differently-after all, he was a murderer and most potential heirs
are not; however, as the dissenting opinion emphasized, it is for the
criminal law to punish murderers, not the law of trusts and estates.173
In a case where there are multiple reasonable views regarding the
purposes that underlie a single rule, a consistently purposive method will
not generate consistent treatment-neither at the level of purposes nor at
the level of rules. Consequently, when purposes are unsettled or when
there are multiple purposes behind some rule, purposive interpretation
becomes problematic for fairness or equality.
(d) When Rules are Unclear or Indeterminate
In some cases, rules fail to prescribe conduct on their own; in these
170. Id. at 516 (Gray, J., dissenting).
171. Id.at518-19.
172. While the majority finds no case law in the area of wills to support its purposive application
of the rule, the dissent finds several: Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 490, with support from Goodright v.
Glasier (1770) 4 Burr. 2512, 2514 and Pemberton v. Pemberton (1807) 13 Ves. 290 (stating that,
"[r]evocation is an act of the mind, which must be demonstrated by some outward and visible sign of
revocation"; and, further, "[t]he rule is that if the testator lets the will stand until he dies, it is his will;
if he does not suffer it to do so, it is not his will"; Gains v. Gains, 2 A.K. Marsh. 190 (Ky. Ct. App.,
1820) (where, as Judge Gray explains, "[t]he court held ... that as none of the acts evidencing
revocation were done, the intention could not be substituted for the act. In that case the will was
snatched away and forcibly retained); Leaycraft v. Simmons, 3 Bradf 35 (N.Y. Ct. App., 1875)
(where the testator wished to change his will to enlarge his daughter's inheritance, but his son, who
was in possession of the will, refused to turn it over and the judge nevertheless admitted the original
will to probate, explaining that, "'[t]he whole of this subject is now regulated by statute, and a mere
intention to revoke, however well authenticated, or however defeated, is not sufficient'); Clingan v.
Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. 25 (Pa., 1857) (where a devisee under a will fraudulently protected the will from
destruction, and yet the court refused to declare the will void against the devisee).
173. I do not mean to suggest that the Riggs decision was a bad one all things considered; that
decision and other similarly reasoned decisions might be justified despite the concerns I have raised.
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cases, legal reasoners will have to look beyond rules if they wish to
determine the actions that rules require or proscribe. In this type of
scenario, courts should adopt a mixed method for interpreting precedent,
which combines rules and purposes. The problem arises in two types of
situation: (1) when a court must decide a dispute where it is very difficult
to determine whether a particular rule applies (although the rule in fact
either does or does not apply), and (2) when a court must decide a dispute
that is undetermined by rules.1 74 Although these two situations are
conceptually distinct, they have a problem in common: rules are an
inadequate means to make a decision based on precedent.
A court can still realize equality in some form on these occasions by
referring to purposes behind rules as interpretive aids.175 If we assume that
rules generally or often do serve their purposes, then on a purposive
approach the parties to the difficult case will get an outcome that serves
the same purposes as similar past cases. Notice that this method sneaks in
elements of the direct-analogy approach: if a given set of facts does not
squarely meet the conditions of a rule from a precedent case, how do we
know whether they are similar enough that we should care to treat them
the same? Perhaps the best that judges can do in this scenario is use their
sense of legal similarity or proximity to make a call as to whether the
cases are sufficiently close to warrant or require equal treatment.
For example, take the tort rule of respondeat superior, where employers
are vicariously liable for the actions of their employees provided the
employees are acting within the scope of employment. Imagine that a case
arises where an employee has negligently caused some harm to a third
party; even though all the facts of the case are known, it is unclear
whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment
when he caused the harm. The rule's purpose is (perhaps among other
things) to encourage employers to exercise care in their hiring decisions
and training practices, as well as to encourage employers to monitor and if
necessary control their employees' conduct.176 Let's say that in the current
case there was nothing that the employer could have done to prevent the
harm that her employee caused (and that the prospect of that harm was
utterly unforeseeable at the time of hiring). On a purposive interpretation
of the doctrine, the employer should not be liable for that harm. If we
assume that the respondeat superior rule is generally well-suited to its
174. A case is undetermined by rules when, in Hart's terminology, its facts are in the penumbra
of legal terms (see supra, Part II, Sec. E.2.).
175. As Schauer notes, the basic strategy is a natural one for dealing with rules under uncertainty:
"when a rule first appears unclear, it seems unimpeachable to look initially to the justifications lying
behind the rule." SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 222.
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006) ("Respondeat superior
creates an incentive for principals to choose employees and structure work within the organization so
as to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.").
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underlying purposes, then the parties in this case would be treated in
conformity with the same purposes as parties to past respondeat superior
disputes, even if those disputes were resolved according to a rule-based
method of interpretation.
(2) Downsides of Multiple Methods
While there are significant virtues of allowing multiple methods for
precedential interpretation, there are also possible downsides. First of all,
the optimal method might not be readily apparent on each occasion of
adjudication; accordingly, we might need an additional method for
determining which method to employ! Here are a few other possible ways
in which embracing multiple methods might backfire: (1) people might
have a hard time predicting what method will be used in their prospective
legal cases, leading to problems of uncertainty; (2) the adoption of a
changeable method could undermine perceived legitimacy, since the lack
of consistency might give the appearance of an inconstant or even
capricious judiciary; (3) on some conceivable conception of procedural
fairness, which emphasizes the formal in formal equality, stare decisis
should look the same for everyone on all occasions. Nevertheless, and
even if we consider a single level of the judicial hierarchy, in practice
adjudicators do employ different methods of precedent across different
disputes.177 In this section, I have shown how such variation might be
warranted by the principle of equality alone. Incorporating the other stare
decisis values, and considering a wider array of cases, would significantly
complicate the matter, but I suspect that the analysis would point in favor
of an inconstant approach to precedential interpretation-one that varies
between a more rule-based approach and a more purposive approach,
sometimes incorporating elements of other approaches such as the direct-
analogy model.
C. Questioning Stare decisis
For the most part in this article I have focused on how courts might
make the most of stare decisis. I have taken for granted that courts are
going to follow some system of precedent. However, I have found that,
despite the ease with which courts enumerate the objectives of stare
decisis, crafting a doctrine of precedent that would realize these goals
effectively and simultaneously is a formidable task. My analysis reveals
the methodological complexities that courts must face if they wish to
make good on the promise of stare decisis when they go about their
business of following precedent. In light of these findings, I wonder if the
177. For a critical discussion of this reality, see KOZEL, supra note 5, at 81, 94.
[Vol. 30:2116
55
Varsava: How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for following
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Varsava
insistence on maintaining a doctrine of stare decisis across all types of
case is warranted.
Strict adherence to precedent in the realm of statutory interpretation
seems particularly questionable.17 8 And yet this is an area where various
courts, state and federal, insist that precedential force is at its strongest.179
For example, the Supreme Court of Texas has maintained that, "'in the
area of statutory construction, the doctrine of stare decisis has its greatest
force' because the Legislature can rectify a court's mistake, and if the
Legislature does not do so, there is little reason for the court to reconsider
whether its decision was correct."180 Likewise the U.S. Supreme Court on
multiple occasions has expressed its commitment to strict stare decisis
with respect to statutory cases. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, for
example, the Court declared that,
the burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an
established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to
overrule a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare
decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter
what we have done. 181
Courts afford extra deference to statutory precedent because they believe
that the legislature should and will step in if something is amiss in judicial
interpretations of a statute.
Accordingly, under the dominant stare decisis jurisprudence, statutes
are generally filtered through previous cases. Courts read a statute through
precedents that read the statute, and follow the precedents' interpretations
even if those interpretations are faulty. However, statutory law and the
legislative process have majoritarian, democratic purposes.1 82 The
178. For arguments against a system of precedent for constitutional cases, see Gary Lawson, The
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence ofPrecedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2006).
179. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 39, at 287 ("The idea has long been advanced that stare decisis
should operate with special vigor in statutory cases . . . ."); William N. Jr. Eskridge, Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J. 1361, 1362 (1988) ("Statutory precedents ... often enjoy a super-
strong presumption of correctness."); Maltz, supra note 5, at 388 ("Typically, precedents relying on
statutory interpretation are viewed as more sacrosanct than their common-law counterparts.").
180. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P. v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. 2008). See also, Conway v.
Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 681, 680 A.2d 242, 257 (1996) (Peters, J., dissenting) (writing that,
"[i]n assessing the force of stare decisis, our case law has emphasized that we should be especially
cautious about overturning a case that concerns statutory construction").
181. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (U.S. 1989). In Patterson, the
Court proceeded as bound by Runyon v. McCrary, a case where the Court had interpreted 42 USC
1981 to apply to private contracts. The Patterson Court decided that, regardless of whether Runyon
represents a correct interpretation of the statute, they would follow it out of allegiance to precedent.
182. As Daniel Farber puts it, when a court follows a precedent that represents fallacious
statutory interpretation, "a court is declining to implement clear decisions by the democratic branches
of government." Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 293
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outcome of a statutory case might better reflect the preferences that the
statute represents if judges disregard previous judicial applications of the
statute, at least in the event that previous applications are patently
incorrect in hindsight.183 If a court is genuinely at a loss as to what a
statute means, then past cases might provide helpful guidance; however, if
a court recognizes that a past case erred in its interpretation of a statute,
adhering to the precedent nevertheless would seem to undermine the
purpose of legislation as well as the judiciary's role in applying that
legislation. 184
Stare decisis requires judges to knowingly replicate previous mistakes,
even in the context of horizontal precedent: as Larry Alexander puts it, "if
incorrectness were a sufficient condition for overruling, there would be no
precedential constraint in statutory and constitutional cases." 185 Does the
judiciary have legitimate authority to knowingly misinterpret and
misapply statutory law? Although courts claim that legislatures can and
will clean up judicial errors, I doubt that legislatures generally do or could
stay on top of judicial mistakes and correct them in a timely fashion. 186
(1989).
183. As William Eskridge observes, "[ilt stands separation of powers on its head to argue that
Congress should correct the Court's own mistake-especially when the mistake is so clear and the
matter so much more within the arena of expertise practically left to the Supreme Court." Supra, note
179, at 1425.
184. Both Eskridge and Judge Frank Easterbrook challenge the idea that statutory cases should
receive more precedential weight than other types of cases, but they do not go so far as to reject
statutory stare decisis altogether. Id.; Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988). Alexander, supra note 59, at 57 notes that "precedential
constraint in statutory and constitutional cases [fits] uneasily with a pure statutory/constitutional
regime" but argues that stare decisis is nonetheless desirable in statutory and constitutional cases
because it delivers legal determinateness and finality. Farber argues that, even though adherence to
mistaken statutory cases "seems to be a violation of the [legislative] supremacy principle," "rational
enacting legislators would probably prefer that courts give strong weight to stare decisis in statutory
cases, even at the expense of fidelity to the original legislative deal"; accordingly, Farber believes that
strong statutory stare decisis is ultimately justifiable. Supra note 182, at 314; 325, n.173. For an
argument in favor of absolute stare decisis in the statutory context, see Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let
Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH L. REv 177
(1989) (arguing that a rule of absolute stare decisis in statutory cases would serve democratic values
because it would incentivize the legislature to overrule precedents more often). Chief Justice Marshall
a wrote draft opinion in Amorous v. United States, a case interpreting the White Slave Traffic Act of
June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), based on the same argument he advanced in his law review article. His
fellow Justices sharply opposed the view in draft concurring opinions, and Marshall dropped the
argument in his final opinion. For a discussion of this history, see William N. Eskridge Jr., The Case
of the Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH L. REV.
2450 (1989).
185. Alexander, supra note 59, at 59.
186. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 179, at 1401 (noting that, "[in most instances, Congress is
either not aware of the Court's statutory interpretations or faces no formal opportunity to examine
those interpretations"); Farber, supra note 182, at 427 (explaining that, "[t]he structural features of
government make legislation hard," and [i]t takes less political support to block a law than to get one
passed"); Maltz, supra note 5, at 389 (arguing that we cannot rely on Congress to intervene in the
event of mistaken statutory interpretations). Moreover, others point out that we should not expect
Congress to override judicial errors in statutory interpretation when the statutes were enacted by a
former Congress. See id. at 389; Easterbrook, supra note 184, at 426.
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Even if we set democratic concerns aside, and consider just the stare
decisis values, it is not clear to me that we would be better off with a
system of precedent in the domain of statutory interpretation. When a
court overturns a statutory precedent, both equality and predictability
stand to suffer. However, equality suffers also when the legislative branch
overturns precedent; I do not see why we should think that the equality
cost associated with a court overruling a precedent is greater than that
associated with a legislature overruling a precedent.
While reliance interests might be thwarted if a court overrules its own
precedent, I am not sure that we should expect people to rely more on
judicial decisions than they do on statutes.18 7 Assuming a court
misconstrued a statute in some past case, why think that individuals will
be more inclined to rely on that decision than the statute itself? In any
event, even supposing people do rely on precedents over statutes (indeed
the current doctrine of stare decisis encourages them to do so),
predictability would not necessarily be harmed by a no stare decisis
regime in the realm of statutory cases, since people could presumably
form predictions based on the statutes themselves. If courts interpreted
these statutes directly rather than through past cases, I see no reason to
think that predictions would be less reliable than they are in the current
regime. They might well be more reliable in the no statutory stare decisis
world.
Finally, a no .statutory stare decisis regime might make for a more
defensible distribution of power. A regime of statutory precedent allows
erroneous judicial interpretations to prevail-even when decision makers
know that the interpretations are erroneous; accordingly, statutory stare
decisis requires courts to prioritize deference to other courts over
deference to the legislature. We might have more reason to be bothered by
this in the context of a court following its own precedents (the horizontal
context) than a court following a higher court's precedents (the vertical
context). Even if a lower court believes that a higher court erred in
interpreting a statute, perhaps we should not trust the lower court to be
correct in that judgment. Accordingly, we accept vertical statutory stare
decisis if only because we think it will minimize error in statutory
interpretation. However, in the horizontal context, it might be more
appropriate for a court to defer to a statute directly rather than the court's
previous interpretations of the statute. In the horizontal context, I do not
know that a court has the power, let alone the obligation, to perpetuate
187. Grover Rees argues that stare decisis is better justified in common law than statutory cases,
because people form predictions based on statutes themselves, rather than judicial interpretations of
statutes. Grover Rees Cathedrals Without Walls: A View from the Outside, 61 TEX. L. REv. 347, 374
(1982) (reviewing GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)).
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previous errors in statutory interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Most basically, this paper has been about common law reasoning-
about the practice of following past judicial decisions in the adjudication
of present disputes. I examined commonly cited justifications for that
practice and evaluated alternative methods of the practice based on how
well they align with those justifications. I found that none of the methods
aligns with the justifications as well as we might like. Nevertheless, some
methods do better than others overall, and certainly some do better than
others with respect to certain values.
I have suggested that our best bet is to embrace a variable approach to
precedent-one that is sensitive to the contextual factors that make one
method preferable to another. Moreover, if judges are open to options for
following precedent, we might see more experimentation around methods
of interpreting and applying precedent as well as increased judicial debate
over the optimal method. I believe this would be an improvement over the
status quo, where judicial disagreements about following precedent tend
to rehash old debates about the sanctity of stare decisis and are often
framed in the black and white terms of whether to respect or overrule
some past decision. Judges have the power to follow the doctrine of
precedent or not. They also have the power, and I think the duty, to
develop methods for following the doctrine that successfully realize well-
recognized values behind stare decisis.
Finally, my analysis suggests, I think, that we should be open to
considering a no stare decisis regime. At least in some areas of law,
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